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Cast of Characters
Schwab Industries, Inc. – The parent company in the Debtors’ conglomerate structure. Schwab
Industries, Inc. was incorporated in Ohio and doing business in northeastern Ohio and
southwestern Florida. Schwab Industries had eight subsidiaries.1
David A. Schwab – David Schwab was the president, a director, and a shareholder of Schwab
Industries. David Schwab was the son and grandson of the founders of Schwab Industries.2
Jerry Schwab – Jerry Schwab was the chairman of Schwab Industries’ board of directors. Jerry
Schwab helped found Schwab Industries as an industrial-supply corporation in 1955.3
David Moreland – David Moreland was the executive vice president of Schwab Industries.
David Moreland supplied testimony in connection with several contested matters throughout the
case. In particular, his testimony became relevant during the first dispute regarding post-petition
financing.4
David Exley – David Exley was the vice president of administration of Schwab Industries.
David Exley testified extensively about the company’s financial practices during the first dispute
regarding post-petition financing.5
Bank of America – Bank of America is an American multinational banking and financial
services corporation headquartered in Charlotte, North Carolina. Bank of America was involved
in Schwab Industries’ secured financing arrangement.6
Huntington National Bank – Huntington National Bank (“Huntington”) became Huntington
Bancshares, Inc. after a recent merger. Huntington is headquarted in Columbus, Ohio and
1

Bloomberg, http://www.bloomberg.com/research/stocks/private/snapshot.asp?
privcapId=4293172 (last visited Apr. 25, 2016).
2

Corporation Wiki, https://www.corporationwiki.com/Florida/Cape-Coral/david-a-schwabP4842879.aspx (last visited Apr. 25, 2016).
3

Corporation Wiki, https://www.corporationwiki.com/Ohio/Dover/jerry-aschwab/47891644.aspx (last visited Apr. 25, 2016).
4

Zoominfo, http://www.zoominfo.com/p/David-Moreland/2069409748 (last visited Apr. 25,
2016).
5

Corporation Wiki, https://www.corporationwiki.com/Florida/Fort-Myers/david-rexley/66113616.aspx (last visited Apr. 25, 2016).
6

Bank of America, http://about.bankofamerica.com/en-us/global-impact/csrreport.html#fbid=iu8ByQOn8MV (last visited Apr. 25, 2016).
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provides full-service banking and commercial financing in the Midwest. Huntington was
involved in Schwab Industries’ secured financing arrangement. The Schwab family also had a
split-dollar life insurance policy that was held in trust with Huntington.7
KeyBank – KeyBank is a subsidiary of the Cleveland-based KeyCorp, which provides retail,
commercial, and investment banking throughout the United States. KeyBank served as the agent
on Schwab Industries’ secured financing. Therefore, KeyBank was the pre-petition lender
predominantly involved in Schwab Industries’ bankruptcy case.8
Judge Russ Kendig – Judge Russ Kendig is a bankruptcy judge in the Northern District of Ohio.
Judge Kendig received his undergraduate degree from Northwestern University and his J.D. from
the Ohio State University. Judge Kendig presided over the Schwab Industries bankruptcy case.9
EFO Financial Group – EFO Financial Group (“EFO Financial”) specialized in underwriting
debtor-in-possession loans and other alternative financing arrangements to U.S.-based
companies. EFO Financial served as a third-party DIP lender to Schwab Industries.10
Naples Lending Group – Naples Lending Group (“Naples”) was a subsidiary of ITG Holdings,
a sophisticated investment firm in Naples, Florida. EFO Financial assigned its interest in the
Debtors’ post-petition financing facility to Naples.11
Hahn, Loeser & Parks – Hahn, Loeser & Parks (“Hahn Loeser”) is a full-service law firm that
was founded in Cleveland in 1920. The firm has seven offices throughout Ohio, southwest
Florida, California, and Illinois. Hahn Loeser served as Schwab Industries’ main bankruptcy
counsel throughout the case.12
Brouse McDowell – Brouse McDowell is a full-service business law firm located in Cleveland,
Ohio. Brouse McDowell served as special counsel for Schwab because Hahn Loeser had
conflicts of interest with the Schwab family.13
7

Huntington, https://www.huntington.com/About-Us (last visited Apr. 25, 2016).

8

KeyBank, https://www.key.com/about/index.jsp (last visited Apr. 25, 2016).

United States Bankruptcy Court Northern District of Ohio, https://www.ohnb.uscourts.gov/
content/chief-judge-russ-kendig (last visited Apr. 25, 2016).
9

10

EFO Financial, http://efofinancial.com (last visited Apr. 25, 2016).

Bloomberg, http://www.bloomberg.com/research/stocks/private/snapshot.asp?
privcapId=142203146 (last visited Apr. 25, 2016).
11

12

Hahn Loeser, http://www.hahnlaw.com (last visited Apr. 25, 2016).

13

Brouse McDowell, http://www.brouse.com (last visited Apr. 25, 2016).
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Thompson Hine – Thompson Hine served as the pre-petition secured lender’s counsel
throughout the bankruptcy case. Alan Lepene, a partner of Thompson Hine, successfully
defended the pre-petition lender’s position that Schwab Industries should not receive $18 million
worth of post-petition financing.14
Western Reserve Partners – Western Reserve Partners (“Western Reserve”) provides
acquisition, capital-raising, and financial advisory services to middle-market companies.
Western Reserve acted as the financial advisor to the bankruptcy estate of Schwab Industries. As
such, Western Reserve helped structure and conduct the auction process. Western Reserve
earned approximately $950,000 in fees from the case.15
Euclid Chemical Company – Euclid Chemical Company (“Euclid Chemical”) is a global
supplier of admixtures, concrete fibers, curing and sealing compounds, structural grouts, epoxy
adhesives, floor hardeners and toppings, joint fillers, industrial and architectural coatings,
decorative color/stains/stamps, and a comprehensive selection of restoration materials. It was
founded in Cleveland, Ohio, in 1910 and operated as a family business until it was purchased in
1984. Euclid Chemical supplied chemicals to Schwab Industries that were necessary for the
production of concrete. Euclid Chemical objected to the Debtors’ post-petition financing
arrangement.16
St. Mary’s Cement – St. Mary’s Cement (“St. Mary’s”) is a cement producer based in Ontario,
Canada. It is one of the oldest cement producers in North America and primarily services the
Great Lakes region. St. Mary’s is currently a wholly owned subsidiary of Vorantim Cimentos.
St. Mary’s was a pre-petition supplier of Schwab Industries that objected throughout the
bankruptcy case.17
Port Manatee’s Port Authority – Port Manatee’s Port Authority operates a deep-water port
located in the eastern Gulf of Mexico at the entrance of Tampa Bay. Schwab Industries leased a
deep-water port from Port Manatee’s Port Authority. Port Manatee’s Port Authority interjected
in the case to ensure Schwab Industries cured any deficiencies prior to assuming and assigning
the lease.18

14

Thompson Hine, http://www.thompsonhine.com (last visited Apr. 25, 2016).

15

Western Reserve, http://wesrespartners.com (last visited Apr. 25, 2016).

16

Euclid Chemical, http://www.euclidchemical.com (last visited Apr. 25, 2016).

17

St. Mary’s, http://www.stmaryscement.com (last visited Apr. 25, 2016).

18

Port Manatee’s Port Authority, http://www.portmanatee.com (last visited Apr. 25, 2016).
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Holcim, Inc. – Holcim, Inc. (“Holcim”) is a wholly owned subsidiary of Holcim, Limited, a
Swiss company that is one of the largest cement suppliers in the world. Holcim was a supplier of
Schwab Industries that objected to stated cure amounts prior to Schwab Industries’ § 363 sale.19
Allen Concrete Company – Allen Concrete Company (“Allen Concrete”) serves residential
contractors and builders in southwest Florida. Allen Concrete specializes in the placement and
finishing of structural concrete. Allen Concrete owned fifty percent of a partnership with
Schwab Industries. Allen Concrete objected to the assignment of Schwab Industries’ partnership
interest in the sale process.20
National Lime & Stone – National Lime & Stone (“National Lime”) was an Ohio corporation
that produced and distributed concrete, aggregates, and minerals. National Lime leased property
and purchased supplies from Schwab Industries. National Lime attempted to raise sufficient
equity to invest in Schwab Industries prior to the bankruptcy case. National Lime was an active
unsecured creditor throughout the case.21
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation – Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (“PBGC”) is
a federal agency created by ERISA (1974) to protect pension benefits in the private sector. The
PBGC objected to preserve Schwab Industries’ liability for $3.2 million in underfunded pension
liability.22
Cement Resources – Cement Resources was a shell corporation formed by Atlas Holdings and
Garmark Partners. Cement Resources served as the stalking horse bidder in the auction and sale
process.23
Atlas Holdings – Atlas Holdings was an investment firm located in Greenwich, Connecticut.
Atlas Holdings had investments throughout the world in, inter alia, building materials. Atlas
Holdings helped form Cement Resources to serve as the stalking horse bidder.24
Garmark Partners – Garmark Partners was an investment firm that provided mezzanine debt
and structured equity capital to middle-market companies. Along with Atlas Holdings, Garmark
Partners formed Cement Resources to serve as the stalking horse bidder.25
19

Holcim, http://www.holcim.us (last visited Apr. 25, 2016).

20

Allen Concrete, http://allenconcreteinc.com/main.html?src=%2F (last visited Apr. 25, 2016).

21

National Lime, http://www.natlime.com (last visited Apr. 25, 2016).

22

PBGC, http://pbgc.gov (last visited Apr. 25, 2016).

23

Cement Resources, http://garmark.com (last visited Apr. 25, 2016).

24

Atlas Holdings, http://www.atlasholdingsllc.com (last visited Apr. 25, 2016).

25

Garmark Partners, http://garmark.com (last visited Apr. 25, 2016).
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OldCastle Materials – OldCastle Materials (“OldCastle”) is the leading vertically integrated
supplier of aggregates and ready-mix concrete in the United States. OldCastle was the
successful purchaser of Schwab Industries’ ready-mix cement and concrete operations at the §
363 sale and auction.26
Resource Land Holdings – Resource Land Holdings was formed in 1998 to invest in
agricultural, timber, and mining properties. Resource Land Holdings purchased a 2,100-acre plot
that contained limestone deposits from Schwab Industries at the § 363 auction.27

26

OldCastle, http://www.oldcastlematerials.com (last visited Apr. 25, 2016).

27

Resource Land Holdings, http://www.rlholdings.com/home1.html (last visited Apr. 25, 2016).
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I. The Debtors’ Businesses

Schwab Industries, Inc. (“Schwab Industries”) was a closely held corporation operating
in Dover, Ohio.28 Schwab Industries served as the parent company to eight other corporations
that were operating across Florida and Ohio. 29 Four members of the Schwab family owned
directly or indirectly all of the equity in Schwab Industries and its eight subsidiaries, which
allowed Jerry Schwab and his son, David, to control the direction of the company.30 Schwab
Industries was engaged in producing, supplying, and distributing ready-mix concrete, concrete
block, cement, and related supplies to commercial, residential, and governmental contractors
throughout northeast Ohio and southwest Florida.31
Northeast Ohio includes the metropolitan areas for Cleveland, Akron, and Youngstown,
and contained a population of approximately 4.5 million people in the first decade of the twenty-

28

See Equity Security Holders, Doc. No. 3, at p. 1; Debtors’ Motion for Post-Petition Financing,
Doc. No. 10, at p. 9. The archetypal definition for a closely held corporation comes from the
Massachusetts case Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype, 328 N.E.2d 505 (Mass. 1975). Donahue
defines a closely held corporation as “typified by: (a) a small number of stockholders; (b) no
ready market for corporate stock; and (c) substantial majority stockholder participation in
management, direction, and operation of the corporation.” Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 512.
29

Debtors’ Motion for Post-Petition Financing, Doc. No. 10, at p. 9–11.

30

Equity Security Holders, Doc. No. 3, at p. 1; Debtors’ Motion for Post-Petition Financing,
Doc. No. 10, at p. 9–10. The equity of Schwab Industries was owned as follows: Jerry Schwab
owned 824 shares; David Schwab owned 505 shares; Marry Lynn Schwab owned 379 shares;
and Donna Schwab owned 123 shares. Equity Security Holders, Doc. No. 3, at p. 1 .
31

Debtors’ Motion for Post-Petition Financing, Doc. No. 10, at p. 8–9.
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first century.32 By contrast, southwest Florida encompassed a population of approximately 1.2
million people as of 2010. 33 A majority of the relevant area in southwest Florida is rural
swampland, which was not exactly ideal for development.34 The area’s three coastal counties,
Lee, Collier, and Charlotte, however, experienced a residential and commercial development
boom between 2002 and 2006.35 In particular, Lee County, which includes the Cape Coral–Fort
Meyers area, issued 5,200 single-family building permits between 2002 and 2006 and
experienced a population growth of approximately 200,000 people. 36 Collier and Charlotte
counties experienced similar growth – but to a lesser extent – during that same period.37
The Schwab family started their family business in 1955.38 The original business was
named Ohio Industrial Supply Corporation and was engaged in buying and selling industrial
equipment.39 The incorporators were A.L. Schwab, Jerry Schwab, Ruth Schwab, and Donna

Ne. Ohio Int’l Bus. Network, Northeast Ohio: A Powerhouse in Middle America, 2006, at 1–2
available at http://www.neoisgreat.com/NE_OHIO.pdf.

32

33

Sw. Fla. Econ. Dev. Alliance, Demographics, Post to Research & Data, Sw. FLA. ECON. DEV.
ALLIANCE, https://swfleda.com/demographics/ (last visited Apr. 12, 2016).

See Reg’l Econ. Research Inst., Southwest Florida Economic Indicators, Feb. 2011, at 21–22
available at http://floridasinnovationcoast.com/files/documents/Regional_EIR_Feb2011.pdf; Sw.
Fla. Econ. Dev. Alliance, Local County Map, SW. FLA. ECON. DEV. ALLIANCE,
https://swfleda.com/interactive-map-county/#.Vw0IgUu-1g0 (last visited Apr. 12, 2016).
34

See Reg’l Econ. Research Inst., Southwest Florida Economic Indicators, Feb. 2011, at 10–15
available at http://floridasinnovationcoast.com/files/documents/Regional_EIR_Feb2011.pdf.
35

36

Id. at 11, 21.

37

Id. at 11–12, 21.

38

OHIO SEC. OF STATE, http://www5.sos.state.oh.us/ords/f?
p=100:7:0::NO:7:P7_CHARTER_NUM:246471 (last visited Apr. 12, 2016).
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Schwab, who all started the company with just $500 in capital. 40 In 1986, Jerry and Donna
Schwab changed the name of the company to Schwab Industries, Inc. and changed the purpose
of the company to producing and selling ready-mix concrete and cement.41 The Schwabs hoped
to take advantage of government initiatives around the Cleveland area by entering the cement
and concrete business. 42 In fact, shortly after the change, projects from state, federal, and
municipal agencies represented a major portion of Schwab Industries’ work in Ohio.43 Schwab
Industries also had a competitive industry advantage via the company’s strategic positioning near
major interstates and high traffic areas, which allowed the company to expediently deliver
materials to building sites.44 As a result, the Schwab family’s small business quickly grew after
entering the concrete and cement industry and, by 2010, employed around 350 people.45
Five of Schwab Industries’ subsidiaries were incorporated and doing business in Ohio.46
Specifically, Medina Cartage Company (“MCC”), Medina Supply Company (“MSC”), Quality

Ohio Supply Corporation’s Articles of Incorporation available at
http://www2.sos.state.oh.us/reports/rwservlet?imgc12g&Din=D026_1898.

39

40

Id.

Amendment to Ohio Industrial Supply’s Articles of Incorporation available at http://
www2.sos.state.oh.us/reports/rwservlet?imgc12g&Din=F899_1595.

41

42

See Debtors’ Motion for Post-Petition Financing, Doc. No. 10, at p. 8–9.

43

Id.

44

Id.

45

Id. at p. 9.

46

Id. at p. 10.
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Block & Supply Company (“QBS”), O.I.S. Tire, Inc. (“OIS”), and Twin Cities Concrete
Company (“TCC”) all were incorporated in Ohio and operated throughout northeast Ohio.47
Each of these subsidiaries had a place in Schwab Industries’ supply chain.

MCC

operated transportation systems, including hauling trucks. 48 MSC, QBS, and TCC together
operated twelve ready-mix plants, two concrete block plants, and one aggregate distribution
terminal. 49 OIS was a tire repair shop in Midvale, Ohio, and its relationship to Schwab
Industries’ overall business model is unclear today.50
Additionally, three of Schwab Industries’ subsidiaries were incorporated and doing
business in Florida.51 In particular, Schwab Ready-Mix, Inc. (“SRM”), Schwab Materials, Inc.
(“SMI”), and Eastern Cement Corporation (“ECC”) were all operating in southwest Florida.52
SRM operated all seven of Schwab Industries’ ready-mix plants in the Fort Meyers
area.53 SMI was a holding company for ECC and was located on a 2,100-acre plot of real estate
in Fort Meyers.54 The 2,100-acre tract of real estate was an attractive asset, as it contained an

47

Id.

48

Id.

49

Id.

At the time of the debtors’ bankruptcy filings in February 2010, OIS had already dissolved and
wound down its business operations and liquidated its assets. See O.I.S’s Articles of Dissolution.
Therefore whether OIS rebuilt tires for MCC or other subsidiaries is unclear, as the subsidiary
did not play a major role in the bankruptcy case.
50

51

Debtors’ Motion for Post-Petition Financing, Doc. No. 10, at p. 10–11.

52

Id.

53

Id.

54

Id.
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operating orange grove and a quarry with aggregate deposits. 55 ECC operated a 40,000 metric
ton import/export terminal in Port Manatee, which was allegedly the largest deep-water port near
the Panama Canal. 56 ECC’s port access allowed Schwab Industries to import and export
concrete materials to and from foreign markets.57 ECC sold forty percent of its imported product
directly to SRM for use at its plants, and the other sixty percent was sold to independent
companies that were not competitive with Schwab Industries.58

55

Id. The aggregate deposits included sand, limestone, and other minerals that are the basic
ingredients for making concrete. Id. Schwab Industries used the aggregate deposits to supply its
ready-mix plants in Florida, which presumably would have integrated its supply chain and
reduced the cost of doing business in two different states. Id. at p. 11. Notably, Schwab
Industries had not obtained permits to mine the aggregate deposits on the property prior to filing
for bankruptcy. Transcript of March 15, 2010 Hearing, Doc. No. 120, at p. 70–71.
56

Debtors’ Motion for Post-Petition Financing, Doc. No. 10, at p. 11.

57

Id.

58

Id.
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II. Events Leading to Filing for Chapter 11

In 2001, Schwab Industries saw an opportunity for it to expand in Fort Meyers’s real
estate market, and its executives decided to take a risk. Between 2002 and 2006, that risk
appeared to pay off as the area experienced a construction boom. 59 In 2007, however, the
housing market across the United States, and especially in Florida, collapsed. 60 In the Fort
Meyers area specifically, residential building permits declined from around 1,000 being issued in
2006 to less than 100 in 2007, with that number range staying consistent through January 2011.61
The real estate decline in Florida caused Schwab Industries to experience a significant
drop in sales. In the 2006 fiscal year, Schwab Industries collected around $208 million in sales
revenue.62 By 2009, the company’s sales had dropped by around 50% to $103 million, which
resulted in an operating loss of approximately $5 million. 63 In 2010, Schwab Industries
projected to collect between $70 to $75 million in revenues.64 This sustained drop in sales over a

59

Reg’l Econ. Research Inst., supra note 7, at 11–12.

60

Id. at 10–12; Debtors’ Motion for Post-Petition Financing, Doc. No. 10, at p. 11.

See Reg’l Econ. Research Inst., supra note 7, at 11. Put differently, the number of residential
building permits dropped by 90% in one year. Id.
61

62

Debtors’ Motion for Post-Petition Financing, Doc. No. 10, at p. 11 n.4.

63

Id.; Transcript of March 2, 2010 Hearing, Doc. No. 120, at p. 6.

64

Transcript of March 2, 2010 Hearing, Doc. No. 120, at p. 94.
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four-year period caused a serious cash flow problem for a company that had recently expanded
and possibly over-leveraged itself.65
As a result of its cash flow problems, Schwab Industries filed a chapter 11 petition on
February 28, 2010.66 The company’s capital structure revealed why Schwab Industries suffered
cash flow problems. In short, with sales revenue dropping, Schwab Industries did not have
enough working capital and cash to meet the payment obligations on its secured and unsecured
debt. Schwab Industries estimated its capital structure as follows:


Estimated Total Value: $118,272,69867
o Cash: $672,69868
o Working Capital: $8,500,00069
o Equipment: $16,100,000
o Real Estate: $31,400,00070

65

Debtors’ Motion for Post-Petition Financing, Doc. No. 10, at p. 11–12.

66

Id. at p. 8.

67

Debtors’ Outline of Closing Arg., Doc. No. 174, at p. 3. The value of the business became a
hotly debated issue during the debtors’ attempt to obtain post-petition financing. These numbers
reflect the debtors’ preferred valuation during those debates. Id. The pre-petition secured
lenders valued the business between $57 and $77 million. See Transcript of March 2, 2010,
Doc. No. 120, at p. 182–184; KeyBank Supp. Obj. to Post-Petition Financing, Doc. No. 134, at
p. 4–5. The court ultimately agreed with the pre-petition secured lenders. See Order Denying
Post-Petition Financing, Doc. No. 192, at p. 1. Therefore, the debtors’ preferred valuation was
probably inflated. The two most highly fluctuating items in the debate were the Port lease and
Corkscrew mining property. See Debtors’ Outline of Closing Arg., Doc. No. 174, at p. 3-4.
Thus, the values that the debtors ascribed to those property interests were most likely the source
of their valuation’s inflation.
68

Debtors’ Motion for Post-Petition Financing, Doc. No. 10, at p. 11. The cash portion was
estimated as of December 2009. Id.

Schwab Industries defined “working capital” as cash, accounts receivable, inventory, and
prepaid expenses. Debtors’ Motion for Post-Petition Financing, Doc. No. 10, at p. 11 n.5.

69
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o Port Manatee Lease: $28,000,000
o Corkscrew Road Property: $ 33,600,000


Total Secured Debt: $59,703,78171
o Revolving Line of Credit: $ 8,582,950
o Term A Loan: $19,125,245
o Term B Loan: 31,995,586



Total Unsecured Debt: $16,590,14972
o Trade Payables: $13,390,14973
o Pension Plan: $3,200,00074

Schwab Industries’ primary secured creditors were Bank of America, N.A., Huntington
National Bank Association (“Huntington”), and KeyBank, N.A (“KeyBank”) (collectively,
“Secured Lenders”).75

KeyBank served as the administrative agent on all of the loans. 76 In

return for each term loan, Schwab Industries granted the lender a security or mortgage interest on
substantially all of Schwab Industries’ personal and real property.77 In return for the revolving
line of credit, Schwab Industries granted the lender a floating security interest that rotated
between accounts receivable and inventory.78

See Debtors’ Outline of Closing Arg., Doc. No. 174, at p. 3. The “Real Estate” item was
exclusive of the port lease and the Corkscrew property. Id.

70

71

Debtors’ Motion for Post-Petition Financing, Doc. No. 10, at p. 12.

72

Id. at p. 12.

73

Id.

74

PGBC’s Obj. to Sale Procedure, Doc. No. 268, at p. 1.

75

KeyBank’s Obj. to Post-Petition Financing, Doc. No. 36, at p. 1.

76

Id.

77

Id. at p. 2.
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In the winter of 2010, Schwab Industries’ cash needs were at a seasonal peak due to the
industry-wide inability to create concrete at cold temperatures, causing a seasonal drop in sales
for concrete producers.79 Already hemorrhaging cash, Schwab Industries did not have enough
money to pay the principal and interest payments due under the Amended and Restated Credit
Agreement with the Secured Lenders. 80

As such, the Secured Lenders notified Schwab

Industries on January 13, 2010, that it was in default on its secured debt.81
Schwab Industries originally sought to refinance with the Secured Lenders and began
negotiations soon after it received the notice of default.82 The Secured Lenders sent Schwab
Industries a term sheet in early February.83 The Secured Lenders’ terms allegedly envisioned
Schwab Industries filing for bankruptcy and liquidating its assets within ninety (90) days of the
petition date. 84 The Secured Lenders also agreed to provide post-petition financing to fund
Schwab Industries’ day-to-day operations until the business was sold.85
The Schwab family naturally did not support the idea of quickly selling the company –
and family legacy – in a bankruptcy proceeding.86 The Schwabs believed that the construction

See Transcript of March 2, 2010 Hearing, Doc. No. 120, at p. 75; Debtor’s Motion to Use Cash
Collateral, Doc. No. 224, at p. 11.
78

79

Debtors’ Motion for Post-Petition Financing, Doc. No. 10, at p. 12.

80

KeyBank’s Obj. to Post-Petition Financing, Doc. No. 36, at p. 2.

81

Id.

82

Id. at p. 3.

83

Id.

84

Transcript of March 2, 2010 Hearing, Doc. 120, at p. 53–54.

85

Id. at p. 47–48; KeyBank Obj. to Post-Petition Financing, Doc. No. 36, at p. 3.
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industry had bottomed out and that the market had nowhere to go except up.87 Further, because
their business relied heavily on government projects, they believed that Schwab Industries was in
a good position to receive federal stimulus monies.88 Therefore, if they could file a chapter 11
petition and stall collection efforts, their business could successfully reorganize and continue to
operate under their control. With these ideas in mind, the Schwabs began discussions with third
parties for post-petition financing.89
On February 27, 2010, the Schwabs notified the Secured Lenders that they were pursuing
financing from a third-party lender,90 and that night, the Secured Lenders received a copy of
Schwab Industries’ motion for post-petition financing.91 The following day, Schwab Industries
and its eight subsidiaries filed voluntary chapter 11 petitions in the Bankruptcy Court for the
Northern District of Ohio, Canton Division, where the case was docketed in Judge Russ
Kendig’s courtroom.92
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Transcript of March 2, 2010 Hearing, Doc. No. 120, at p. 53–54.
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Debtors’ Outline of Closing Arg., Doc. No. 174, at p. 6.
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Debtors’ Motion for Post-Petition Financing, Doc. No. 10, at p. 9.
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Debtors’ Motion for Post-Petition Financing, Doc. No. 10, at p. 12–13.
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KeyBank Objection to Post-Petition Financing, Doc. No. 36, at p. 3.
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Id.
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Debtors’ Voluntary Petition, Doc. No. 1, at p. 1 ; Debtors’ Motion for Post-Petition Financing,
Doc. No. 10, at p. 8.
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III. Section 364(c)–(d) Financing

Along with the petition, Schwab Industries and its subsidiaries (collectively, “Debtors”)
filed several first-day motions. All of these motions were either intended to facilitate the
administration of the estate or to smooth day-to-day operations that were necessary to continue
the Debtors’ businesses.93 For example, the Debtors filed a motion to pay sales, franchise, and
real estate property taxes, which had accrued in the amount of $821,193.94 The Debtors also
filed motions to pay pre-petition wages, salaries, and benefits of employees and retain certain
bankruptcy professionals.95 Additionally, the Debtors moved to jointly administer the cases of
the parent corporation, Schwab Industries, and its eight subsidiaries for administrative

GEORGE W. KUNEY ET AL. & MICHAEL L. BERNSTEIN, BANKRUPTCY IN PRACTICE 273–74
(Charles J. Tabb eds., 5th ed. 2015).
93

94

Debtors’ Motion to Pay Taxes, Doc. No. 14, at p. 8–10.

Debtor’s Motion to Pay Employees, Doc. No. 20, at p. 8–12; Debtors’ App. to Employ Hahn,
Loeser & Parks, Doc. No. 7, at p. 8. In its application for employment, Hahn, Loeser & Parks
disclosed that it had represented two of the Secured Lenders in previous matters. Debtors’ App
to Employ Hahn, Loeser & Parks, Doc. No. 7, at p. 15. Although Hahn, Loeser & Parks worked
for a subsidiary of Bank of America in an unrelated matter, it represented Huntington when the
bank set up an irrevocable insurance trust for the Schwab family. Id. Hahn, Loeser & Parks
argued that the prior representation did not affect their “disinterestedness” or present a material
conflict of interest. 11 U.S.C. § 327(a) (“The trustee, with the court’s approval, may employ one
or more attorneys...that do not hold or represent an interest adverse to the estate, and that are
disinterested persons....”); Id. The Court granted Hahn, Loeser & Parks’s motion for
employment, which set the stage for a malpractice suit later in the case. Order Granting App. to
Employ Hahn, Loeser & Parks, Doc. No. 200, at p. 4.
95
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convenience.96 The court granted all of these motions without much debate on either side, as the
Debtors needed to pay employees, maintain their bank accounts, continue to use their utilities,
and pay taxes to operate their businesses and generate value for the estate.97
Moreover, the Debtors filed a motion for post-petition financing on the same day as the
other first-day motions.98 This motion became the first meaningfully contested matter in the case
because the Debtors sought such financing pursuant to Section 364(c) or (d) of the Bankruptcy
Code.
To receive post-petition financing, both Sections 364(c) and (d) first require the debtorin-possession to show that alternative financing terms were unavailable on less onerous terms.99
The major difference between Sections 364(c) and (d) is the amount of court involvement and
the priority of the security interest granted under each section. 100 Under Section 364(c), the
debtor can ask the court to grant the post-petition lender an administrative expense with priority
over other administrative expenses, additional liens on property that is not already subject to an
existing lien, or a junior lien.101 The court must provide pre-petition lenders with notice and
hearing prior to granting such relief.102 Under Section 364(d), the debtor is permitted to ask the

Debtors’ Motion for Joint Admin., Doc. No. 6, at p. 6; see 11 U.S.C. § 1015(b) (allowing joint
administration if a joint petition of two or more petitions are pending in the same court).
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See Order Granting Joint Admin., Doc. No. 41, at p. 2-3; Order Allowing Payment of
Shipper’s Liens, Doc. No. 42, at p. 4-5; Order Granting Payment of Employees, Doc. No. 43, at
p. 5-6; Order Allowing Use of Bank Accounts, Doc. No. 57, at p. 4-6; Order Allowing Use of
Utilities, Doc. No. 58, at p. 4-7; Order Allowing Payment of Taxes, Doc. No. 59, at p. 4.
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See Debtors’ Motion for Post-Petition Financing, Doc. No. 10.
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11 U.S.C. § 364(c)–(d); KUNEY & BERNSTEIN, supra note 66, at 261.
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KUNEY & BERNSTEIN, supra note 65, at 261.
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11 U.S.C. § 364(c)(1)-(3); id.
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Court to grant the post-petition lender a senior or equal lien on property of the estate that is
already subject to a lien – that is, a priming lien.103 The Court must provide pre-petition lenders
with notice, a hearing, and adequate protection prior to granting relief under Section 364(d).104
Further, the debtor-in-possession bears the burden of proof on the issue of adequate protection.105
The Debtors claimed that they attempted to obtain alternative debt financing on an
administrative expense or junior lien basis and equity financing. 106 Potential lenders rejected
both of the debt proposals, however, because both situations would leave those lenders second in
line to the Secured Lenders. 107 The Debtors also loosely discussed with a few investors a
possible equity investment in their businesses; but because the housing market had crashed,
investors probably did not see any feasible return on the Debtors’ businesses in the near future.108
The Debtors alleged that these attempts to obtain alternative financing were sufficient to meet
Section 364(c) and (d)’s background conditions.109
Further, the Debtors asked the court to grant the potential debtor-in-possession lender
(“DIP lender”) super-priority administrative expense claims, first priority liens on any

102

11 U.S.C. § 364(c); KUNEY & BERNSTEIN, supra note 66, at 261.
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11 U.S.C. § 364(d); KUNEY & BERNSTEIN, supra note 66, at 261.
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KUNEY & BERNSTEIN, supra note 66, at 261–62.
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11 U.S.C. § 364(d)(2).
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Debtors’ Motion for Post-Petition Financing, Doc. No. 10, at p. 12–13, 18.
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See Transcript for March 2, 2010 Hearing, Doc. No. 120, at p. 90–93.
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See id.
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See 11 U.S.C. § 364(c)–(d); Transcript for March 2, 2010 Hearing, Doc. No. 120, at p. 93.
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unencumbered assets, and priming liens on any previously encumbered assets. 110 Since the
Secured Lenders already had security interests in substantially all of the Debtors’ assets, the
Debtors proposed that the court grant the Secured Lenders adequate protection in the form of
replacement liens.111 To grant replacement liens under Section 364(d)(1)(B), the court had to
determine whether the Debtors could show (1) that sufficient equity would remain in their
businesses to prevent a diminution in value of the Secured Lenders’ collateral or (2) that the
proceeds of the loan would help increase the value of the Secured Lenders’ collateral.112
After the Debtors filed their motion, the primary issue became whether Schwab
Industries had a sufficient “equity cushion” to prevent diminution in the value of the Secured
Lenders’ collateral.113 While courts differ in the amount of such equity that is necessary, they
generally agree that the equity cushion must be at least twenty (20) percent of the total value of
the business to afford adequate protection. 114 Therefore, the court had to determine whether
Schwab Industries had an equity cushion of at least twenty (2) percent after incurring the postpetition debt.
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Debtors’ Motion for Post-Petition Financing, Doc. No. 10, at p. 7.
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Id.
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Swedeland Dev. Group, Inc. v. Resolution Trust Corp., 16 F.3d 552, 557 (3d Cir. 1994);
KeyBank Obj. to Post-Petition Financing, Doc. No. 36, at p. 5; Committee Objection to PostPetition Financing, Doc. No. 117, at p. 10.
113

See Debtors’ Motion for Post-Petition Financing, Doc. No. 10, at p. 21; KeyBank Obj. to
Post-Petition Financing, Doc. No. 36, at p. 5–7.
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See, e.g., Pistole v. Mellor, 734 F.2d 1396, 1401 (9th Cir. 1984).
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A. Terms of the Loan
After their failed attempts to obtain credit elsewhere, the Debtors began negotiations with
EFO Financial Group (“EFO Financial”) for post-petition financing. 115

EFO Financial

specialized in underwriting debtor-in-possession loans and other alternative financing
arrangements to U.S.-based real estate projects and corporations. 116 As an underwriter, EFO
Financial probably sold most of its loans to other distressed investors in the market. EFO
Financial maintained its principal place of business in Naples, Florida.117
EFO Financial agreed to serve as the proposed DIP lender prior to the commencement of
Schwab Industries’ bankruptcy case.118 The Debtors and EFO Financial memorialized the terms
of the proposed debtor-in-possession loan (“DIP loan”) in a commitment letter that was attached
to the Debtors’ post-petition financing motion. 119 The commitment letter provided that the
Debtors would receive a maximum principal amount of $18,308,655, which would be advanced
in three separate stages.120 The Debtors promised to spend the funds in accordance with a 13week budget that the Debtors and the DIP lender agreed upon.121

115

Debtors’ Motion for Post-Petition Financing, Doc. No. 10, at p. 14; Debtors’ Brief in Support
of Post-Petition Financing, Doc. No. 114, at p. 2.
116

EFO Financial, http://efofinancial.com/financing_solutions.htm (last visited Apr. 12, 2016).

117

EFO Financial, http://efofinancial.com/index.htm (last visited Apr. 12, 2016).
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See KeyBank Obj. to Post-Petition Financing, Doc. No. 36, at p. 3.
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Commitment Letter, Doc. No. 10-2.
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Commitment Letter, Doc. No. 10-2, at p. 2.
Id. at p. 3.
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In the first stage, the DIP lender would advance $3.5 million upon the court’s entry of an
interim order.122 In the second stage, the DIP lender would advance another $3.5 million upon
the entry of another interim order and the Debtors’ satisfaction of certain conditions, including:
(1) purchasing title insurance, from a company satisfactory to the DIP lender, on all real property
in which the DIP lender retained a priming lien and naming the DIP lender as lost payee and
additional insured; (2) executing any mortgage interests and security interests to give the DIP
lender rights in certain collateral; and (3) a finding that the order of the court could not be
appealed, stayed, or modified. 123

Finally, the DIP lender would advance the remaining

$11,308,655 under an order authorizing such an advance and the completion of due diligence
review.124 The Debtors agreed to use the proceeds of the final advance to satisfy the outstanding
principal, unpaid interest, and expenses for the first two advances.125
The DIP loan contained several terms, which, although unfavorable to the Debtors, were
fairly consistent with market rates at the time. First, the interest rate was twelve (12) percent and
increased to twenty (20) percent if the Debtors defaulted.126 The first interest payment on the
emergency advance would total $42,000 as a result. Further, the DIP lender was entitled to a two
percent (2) commitment fee on each advance that would total approximately $360,000 if every
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Id. at p. 2.
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Id. at p. 2, 10–14; Debtors’ Motion for Post-Petition Financing, Doc. No. 10, at p. 5.
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Debtors’ Motion for Post-Petition Financing, Doc. No. 10, at p. 5; Commitment Letter, Doc.
No. 10-2, at p. 2–3.
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Commitment Letter, Doc. No. 10-2, at p. 3.
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Id. at p. 4.
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advance were made.127 The DIP lender was also entitled to a two (2) percent exit fee of the
entire principal amount at the loan’s maturity.128 The DIP lender would receive a one and a tenth
(1.1) percent loan-servicing fee on each advance, which would total $198,000 if every advance
were made.129 Lastly, the DIP lender was entitled to an unused-line fee that amounted to thirty
five hundredths (0.35) of a percent per month of the principal that had not been advanced after
thirty (30) days from the entry of a final order. 130 Therefore, assuming all advances were
disbursed on schedule, the Debtors would pay $960,000 in fees to the DIP lender.
The terms of the proposed DIP loan were common in the 2010 marketplace. Beginning
in 2008, DIP lenders were experiencing returns in the mid to upper teens from the combination
of high interest rates and fees.131 Between 2008 and 2009, the average interest rate on a DIP loan
was around twelve (12) percent, which is exactly what the proposed DIP lender charged the
Debtors.132 Further, the average upfront and exit fee was around two (2) to four (4) percent,
which was commensurate to the proposed commitment and exit fees that EFO Financial charged
the Debtors. 133 Underwriters, such as EFO Financial, also demanded fees for arranging,
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Id. at p. 14.
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Id. at p. 14.
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Id. at p. 5.
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Id. at p. 5.
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Kenneth Steinberg & Christopher Robertson, Key Developments and Trends in DIP
Financing, WEST PRACTICAL LAW (Feb. 19, 2010) at p. 1 available at
http://www.davispolk.com/sites/default/files/kenstein.chrobert.practical.law_.finance.article.03.2
4.15.PDF.
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Id.; Debtors’ Motion for Post-Petition Financing, Doc. No. 10, at p. 4.
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underwriting, and syndicating DIP loans during this period, which explains why EFO Financial
charged the loan-service fee and an unused line-fee.134 Therefore, the Debtors at least received
market rates on the proposed financing arrangements, although the terms of the proposed DIP
loan appear facially unfavorable today.
The DIP loan also contained several conditions precedent that the Debtors were required
to satisfy prior to any advance of funds. Most importantly, the Debtors had to grant to the DIP
lender a first priority lien on any of the Debtors’ post-petition assets, excluding avoidance
actions, and a first-priority priming lien on any other assets.135 The obligations of the Debtors
under the loan were also ranked as super-priority administrative expenses, subject only to a
“carve-out” for the Debtors’ professionals in the amount of $250,000.136
Additionally, the DIP loan contained fairly standard events of default, including: (1) the
failure to pay principal and interest payments on time, (2) any covenant defaults, (3) entry of an
order converting or dismissing the Debtors’ chapter 11 case, and (4) entry of an order granting a
lien or security interest in any collateral in favor of any other party that is senior to the DIP
lender’s priming lien.137 Upon the occurrence of a default event, the Debtors, the U.S. Trustee,
and the unsecured creditors’ committee’s counsel were all entitled to written notice specifying
the default.138 Any party entitled to notice had five (5) days to cure a default, and if that five-day

133

Steinberg & Robertson, supra note 104, at p. 1; Debtors’ Motion for Post-Petition Financing,
Doc. No. 10, at p. 4.
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See Steinberg & Robertson, supra note 104, at p. 1.
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Commitment Letter, Doc. No. 10-2, at p. 5–6.
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Id. at p. 6–7; see infra note 497.
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Debtors’ Motion for Post-Petition Financing, Doc. No. 10, at p. 8.
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period expired, the DIP lender had the right to file an emergency motion with the court for relief
from the automatic stay. 139 At that point, the Debtors only had the right to contest the
declaration of a default, which implies that they could not assert any other defenses relating to
the automatic stay.140
B. The Lack of Adequate Protection
In their motion, the Debtors sought financing under Section 364(d) of the Code. 141
Section 364(d) required the Debtors to show that the Secured Lenders were adequately protected
from any decline in the value of their collateral if the court granted priming liens.142 Section 361
of the Code defines adequate protection to include periodic cash payments, replacement or
additional liens, or any other basis of relief that will provide a creditor with the “indubitable
equivalent” of his or her interest in the debtor’s property.143 The focus of the requirement is to
protect the secured lender’s property interest from any diminution of value, which is required
because imposition of a priming lien via a court order could be an uncompensated “taking” of
property under the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, unless there is adequate
protection, in which case no taking would occur because there would be no loss in value.144
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140

Id.

141

Debtors’ Post-Petition Financing Motion, Doc. No. 10, at p. 7.
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The Debtors argued that if the businesses were valued as a going concern, then a
sufficient equity cushion existed to grant the Secured Lenders additional or replacement liens to
an extent that would adequately protect the Secured Lenders’ interest in their pre-petition
collateral. 145 The Debtors believed that the proposed debtor-in-possession financing (“DIP
financing”) would enhance the value of the estate because it would preserve the operations of the
businesses.146 By contrast, a quick liquidation would actually be worse for the Secured Lenders,
according to the Debtors, as the estate would lose the value of any goodwill and marketplace
advantage that the businesses had accrued.147 In short, the Debtors’ ready-mix operations were
simply worth more as an operating unit. As a result, the Debtors concluded that the post-petition
financing actually benefited all of the parties in interest because it allowed the Debtors to
preserve going-concern value.148
Prior to the first hearing, the Secured Lenders, through their agent, KeyBank, quickly
filed an objection to the Debtors’ motion.149 The Secured Lenders took issue with the Debtors’
actions on the eve of the bankruptcy. Specifically, the Secured Lenders contended that they were
given less than twenty-four (24) hours’ notice of the Debtors’ intent to seek such drastic relief in
the bankruptcy court.150 The Secured Lenders argued that the bankruptcy court would violate the
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Debtors’ Brief in Support of Post-Petition Financing, Doc. 114, at p. 3–4.
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Secured Lenders’ due process rights if it granted priming liens on such short notice.151 This part
of the Secured Lenders’ argument was essentially a plea for the court to hear more than the
Debtors’ side of the story prior to priming the Secured Lenders’ liens on the Debtors’ collateral.
Next, the Secured Lenders claimed the Debtors could not provide adequate protection.152
To satisfy Section 364(d), the Debtors had to provide the Secured Lenders with the same
protection that the Secured Lenders would have received absent any priming lien. 153 The
Secured Lenders argued the Debtors’ businesses did not have a large enough “equity cushion” to
grant replacement or additional liens that approximated the value of the Secured Lenders’
interests subordinated by the proposed priming liens.154
Further, the Secured Lenders argued that the court could not grant the DIP lender
irrevocable priming liens through an interim order.155 The Secured Lenders believed that the
Debtors’ proposed interim relief was not truly interim, as the Debtors had asked the court to
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Id. at p. 4–5; see U.S. Const. amend. V.
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KeyBank Obj. to Post-Petition Financing, Doc. No. 36, at p. 5–7.

See In re Swedeland Dev. Group, Inc., 16 F.3d at 564 (“The [proposed adequate protection]
should provide the pre-petition creditor with the same level of protection it would have had if
there had not been post-petition super[-]priority.”).
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KeyBank Obj. to Post-Petition Financing, Doc. No. 36, at p. 6–7.

See KeyBank Obj. to Post-Petition Financing, Doc. No. 36, at p. 8–9. The Secured Lenders’
argument contains references to Section 364(e) because the Debtor said Section 364(e) allowed
the court to grant priming liens in an interim order. Id. Section 364(e) renders moot any appeal
to reverse or modify a final order that authorizes the extension of credit or accrual of debt if a
court issues a final order finding that the credit was extended or the debt was incurred in good
faith. 11 U.S.C. § 364(e). Thus, the Secured Lenders said that Section 364(e) only applies to
final orders by the plain language of the statute. KeyBank Obj. to Post-Petition Financing, Doc.
No. 36, at p. 8. Nevertheless, the gravamen of the Secured Lenders’ objection was that the court
was granting final relief in an interim order, which is not authorized by any section of the Code.
Id.
155
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grant irrevocable priming liens that would permanently “reshuffle” the priority ladder by making
the Secured Lenders junior to the proposed DIP lender.156 If the court granted an irrevocable
priming lien through an interim order, the Secured Lenders would lose the opportunity to
convince the court to reverse that order at the final hearing.157 As such, the Secured Lenders
believed that the requested interim order truly granted final relief on an expedited basis, which
limited the amount of time the Secured Lenders had to collect evidence and challenge the
proposed post-petition financing.158
Lastly, the Secured Lenders argued that the EFO Financial’s commitment was an illusory
contract.159 The commitment letter gave EFO Financial the right to terminate the contract in its
“absolute and sole discretion” and “for any reason whatsoever.”160 The Secured Lenders said
EFO Financial had not really given anything of value if its promise to advance funds was subject
to capricious termination.161 As such, EFO Financial’s commitment was illusory.162
On March 2, 2010, the court held a hearing to consider, inter alia, whether to grant an
interim order authorizing the Debtors to obtain the first advance of the DIP loan. 163 At the
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hearing, Larry Oscar of Hahn, Loeser & Parks (“Hahn Loseser”) and Marc Merklin of Brouse
McDowell appeared as main and special counsel for the Debtors, while Alan Lepene of
Thompson Hine appeared as main counsel for KeyBank.164
The Debtors and Secured Lenders primarily debated the proper method for valuing the
Debtors’ businesses at the hearing.165 The chosen valuation method was related to whether there
was a sufficient equity cushion to provide adequate protection to the Secured Lenders.166 The
Debtors contended that a going-concern value of the businesses was appropriate because the
Debtors had a viable business plan that created a reasonable prospect of successful
reorganization.167
The Debtors presented testimony from David Moreland, the executive vice president of
Schwab Industries, and David Exley, vice president of administration of Schwab Industries.168
Both of the executives highlighted the most important assets of the business and trends in the
construction industry.169 Specifically, David Moreland testified about the unique nature of the
deep-water port in Manatee, Florida and the potential for mining on the “Corkscrew” quarry
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Transcript of March 2, 2010 Hearing, Doc. 120, at p. 1, 34–35.
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property, which contained limestone deposits.170 David Moreland estimated that the lease on the
deep-water port was worth $35 to $40 million alone. 171 David Exley added that the slow
collection of accounts receivable in the construction industry deflated the Debtors’ borrowing
base and cash flow projections, which tended to artificially degrade the Debtors’ financial
condition.172
In response, Alan Lepene claimed a liquidation value of the businesses’ assets was the
most appropriate valuation because the Debtors had no reasonable chance of successful
reorganization.173 Because the Debtors had touted the deep-water port as a valuable asset, Alan
Lepene effectively presented the port’s uselessness through cross-examination of David
Moreland and David Exley. David Moreland admitted that the port was currently shut down,
and David Exley admitted that collection of accounts receivable for the port was considerably
slower than for the Debtors’ ready-mix operations.174 Further, Alan Lepene proffered evidence
that showed that thirty (30) to forty (40) percent of the Debtors’ clients were involved in the
residential construction market, which was severely depressed in the spring of 2010.175
That being said, Alan Lepene only presented one appraisal of the Debtors’ businesses
after the Debtors presented hours of testimony. 176 Even if the court doubted some of the
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Debtors’ claims, the court simply had more information to consider from the Debtors’ point of
view. Furthermore, the Debtors’ position was fairly sympathetic—the Debtors were a local
family business that employed hundreds of people. The court accordingly granted the Debtors’
proposed relief and allowed the first draw of $3.5 million.177 The Court set a final hearing for
March 17, 2010, to determine whether the Debtors should receive the final two advances on the
loan.178
The court’s decision relied upon the Debtors’ valuation methods, which indicated that
only a value of $72 million was necessary to provide a twenty (20) percent equity cushion.179
Based upon the limited testimony offered, the court found that the Debtors had demonstrated a
value approximating that figure.180
The court gave some indication, however, that the post-petition financing did not quite
live up to the Debtors’ expectations. For example, the court took note of the fact that the Debtors
had not presented any viable plan for reorganization.181 Further, the DIP loan contained terms
that the Court believed might hinder the Debtors’ ability to repay the loan.182 Judge Kendig
described his attitude about the hearing in the following manner:
I feel like it's a scene in a bad movie where we're insisting on driving over the
See id. at p. 110. The Debtors’ witnesses testified – including on cross-examination – from
2:18 p.m. until 11:42 p.m. See id. at p. 62, 142.
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cliff together. And if we have to do that, we'll do that and then we'll issue a
decision when we come back. And we'll either be three and a half million more
dollars down in terms of money that's been put into a, what is currently a cash
losing operation, or perhaps more, depending on . . . what the proof is when we
return.183
The court issued a written order the following day in accordance with its oral decision at
the March 2, 2010, hearing.184 Under that order, the Debtors received a $3.5 million emergency
advance of funds in accordance with the commitment letter between the Debtors and EFO
Financial.185 At this point, EFO Financial – the originator of the loan – had assigned its interest
to Naples Lending Group (“Naples”)186, which is a subsidiary of a sophisticated hedge fund that
specializes in distressed investing. 187 The court granted Naples a priming lien on all of the
Debtors’ assets, including assets acquired after the petition date, and a super-priority
administrative expense claim for any deficiency. 188 The court also granted to the Secured
Lenders replacement liens equal to the aggregate diminution of value caused by Naples’s
priming liens. 189 The Secured Lenders’ liens, however – and all other claims below those
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lenders – were subordinated to Naples’s lien interest, which obviously heightened the intensity of
the case for the creditors.190
By March 12, 2010, specific unsecured creditors started filing objections to the proposed
post-petition financing. For example, St. Mary’s Cement Company (“St. Mary’s) asserted a
claim of reclamation under Section 546(c) of the Code and Section 1302.76 of the Ohio Revised
Code.191 Section 546(c) provides that a seller may reclaim goods sold to a debtor so long as the
debtor received the goods, while insolvent, within forty-five (45) days of the commencement of
the bankruptcy case.192 To perfect a claim of reclamation, the seller must send a written demand
to the debtor within forty-five (45) days of the debtor’s receipt of the goods or within twenty (20)
days of the commencement of the bankruptcy case. 193 St. Mary’s had shipped goods to the
Debtors, while they were insolvent, within forty-five (45) days of the petition date, thereby
satisfying the requirements under Section 546(c).194 Further, St. Mary’s had made demand on
the Debtors to perfect their reclamation claim.195
Ohio Revised Code’s Section 1302.76 is Ohio’s version of UCC 2-702. St. Mary’s
alleged that the Sixth Circuit had interpreted that provision to prevent a secured creditor from
defeating a seller’s right to reclamation.196 St. Mary’s further argued that the proposed DIP loan

190

Id. at p. 14.

191

St. Mary’s Obj. to Post-Petition Financing, Doc. No. 104, at p. 1.

192

See 11 U.S. 546(c).

193

Id.

194
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would defeat its right to reclaim those goods because the goods would become subject to the
DIP’s priming liens.197 As such, St. Mary’s asked the court to include its reclamation claim in
the administrative “carve out” that the Debtors’ motion created.198
Euclid Chemical Company (“Euclid Chemical”) also filed a comment in response to the
Debtors’ motion for post-petition financing. 199 Euclid Chemical claimed that it had installed
“dispenser equipment” at one of the Debtors’ ready-mix plants.200 The equipment consisted of a
chemical admixture dispenser, a tank, assembly, a shed, and a trailer. 201 Euclid Chemical
claimed that it had not transferred any ownership in its equipment to the Debtors.202 Therefore,
Euclid Chemical argued that the equipment was not “property of the estate” within the meaning
of Section 541(a) because the Debtors did not have an interest in the equipment. 203 Euclid
Chemical accordingly asked the court to exclude the property from any priming lien and require
the Debtors to return the property as soon as possible.204
On March 15, 2010, the Unsecured Creditors’ Committee (the “Committee”) filed a
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detailed objection to the proposed post-petition financing deal.205 The Committee believed that
the Debtors had provided insufficient information on the issues of “alternative financing” and
“adequate protection” under Section 364(d).206 The Committee alleged that the Debtors had only
offered “conclusory explanations” of its attempts to obtain alternative financing.207 Further, the
Committee believed that the debtor-in-possession facility protected the Secured Lenders’
interests in a “superficial manner.”208 The Committee pointed out that the Secured Lenders’
appraisal showed a $4.8 million deficiency claim for the Secured Lenders if the court authorized
the entire debtor-in-possession facility. 209 The Committee contended such a large deficiency
claim would greatly impair the position of the unsecured creditors.210
Furthermore, the Committee argued that the commitment letter contained several
commercially unreasonable terms. 211 For example, the Committee highlighted that the final
advance on the loan required the Debtors to pay hefty “service” and “commitment” fees, even
though the advance was intended to pay off the previous two advances. 212 The Committee
argued that the loan agreement was drafted overly broadly, as it contained several “materially
adverse change” clauses and allowed the DIP lender to terminate the agreement in its sole
205
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discretion.213 The Committee also alleged that the $250,000 “carve out” for professional fees
was insufficient to meet the Debtors’ likely expenses.214
Overall, the Committee and the Secured Lenders had developed two points of attack on
the proposed financing deal that ultimately proved successful. Viewed together, the Committee
and the Secured Lenders argued (1) that the Debtors had chosen the wrong method to value their
businesses, which inflated their prospects of reorganization, and (2) that the Debtors had not
obtained a commercially reasonable loan commitment—instead, the DIP loan would actually
hurt the Debtors’ prospects of reorganization.215
On their part, the Debtors continued to contend that an equity cushion was available if the
court applied a going-concern value to its businesses. 216 The Debtors claimed that their
businesses were projected to generate positive EBITDA217 and net positive cash flows.218 A key
link in the Debtors’ valuation was the Corkscrew mining property, a 2,100-acre plot of real estate
near Fort Meyers, Florida.219 The Debtors estimated that the property would generate significant
revenue in the future because it contained limestone deposits, despite the Debtors’ failure to

213

Id. at p. 14, 19.

214

Id. at p. 19.

215

See KeyBank Supp. Obj. to Post-Petition Financing, Doc. No. 134, at p. 6–9; Committee Obj.
to Post-Petition Financing, Doc. No. 117, at p. 15–20.
216

Debtor’s Outline of Closing Arg., Doc. No. 174, at p. 1.

217

EBITDA is an acronym for “earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization.”

218

Debtors’ Outline of Closing Arg., Doc. No. 174, at p. 1.

219

Id. at p. 1-2; see supra, note 70.

38

obtain the proper mining permits for the property. 220 The Debtors presented testimony from
another cement company executive, Neal Montgomery, who claimed that obtaining a permit on
the property was possible.221 The Debtors also offered testimony to show that the construction
industry was on the rebound. Ergo, the Debtors claimed that the DIP loan was being used to
fund the costs of bankruptcy so that the Debtors could successfully organize and increase the
value of the estate.
By contrast, the Secured Lenders continued arguing that “orderly liquidation value” was
appropriate.222 This valuation method assumed that the Debtors’ assets would be sold without
the normal market exposure. The method essentially asks what a debtor could obtain for each
asset or the entire business through a quick sale, as opposed to how much money the Debtors’
businesses could generate if they continued to operate.223
The Secured Lenders advocated that “orderly liquidation value” was appropriate because
the Debtors had not submitted a reasonable plan for reorganization.224 The construction markets
in Fort Meyers, Florida, and Cleveland, Ohio, showed no signs of recovering from their sharp
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declines, and the Debtors were still projected to experience negative cash flows.225 Any equity
investor, therefore, was unlikely to infuse a large amount of capital into the businesses.226 The
Secured Lenders’ appraisals accordingly showed the Debtors’ businesses as valued between
$47.5 and $60 million.227 Because the Debtors would have $75 million in total debt after the
DIP loan, the Secured Lenders reasoned that the court could not provide adequate protection in
any form because the available equity cushion would be far below twenty (20) percent.228
The court ultimately agreed with the Secured Lenders and, in a short, one-paragraph
order, denied the Debtors’ motion for post-petition financing.229 It appears that the court made
the correct decision because the Secured Lenders’ valuation of the Debtors businesses was the
most reasonable. The Debtors relied heavily on the future production of a mining property that
lacked permits. 230 With the Debtors already bleeding cash and lacking a viable plan to
reorganize, liquidation appeared inevitable, and allowing the Debtors to incur further
indebtedness would only harm the interests of creditors without supplying a corresponding
benefit to the businesses.231
Judge Kendig had already hinted at the first hearing that he was skeptical of the loan’s
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terms and the Debtors’ chances of successful reorganization.232 Because the Secured Lenders
had two weeks – rather than four days – to prepare their arguments, they were able to take a solid
stance against the Debtors’ proposed valuation. After hearing both sides of the case, the judge
could presumably see that the Debtors were essentially asking the court to allow equity to bet
against the odds with the creditors’ money, which would irreparably harm the interests of the
creditors. As such, it appears that Judge Kendig correctly denied the Debtors’ motion to obtain
post-petition financing.
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See Transcript of March 2, 2010 Hearing, Doc. No. 120, at p. 190–91.
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IV. The Sales Process – Part I

After the court denied the Debtors’ motion to authorize post-petition financing, the
Debtors were forced to make a deal with the Secured Lenders to use their cash collateral to fund
ongoing operations. Cash collateral is defined in Section 363(a) to include “property in which
the estate and an entity other than the estate have an interest.” 233 The property covered under
Section 363 includes “cash, negotiable instruments, documents of title, securities, deposit
accounts, or other cash equivalents.” 234 To use cash collateral, a debtor-in-possession must
receive the consent of “each entity that has an interest in such collateral” or receive court
approval after a notice and a hearing. 235 Because the Debtors had a revolving line of credit
secured by a floating lien on receivables and inventory, most of their cash constituted of cash
collateral.236 As such, the Debtors were forced to request the Secured Lenders’ permission to use
cash collateral to continue to fund business operations.
The Secured Lenders would only allow the use of their cash collateral if the Debtors
agreed to certain terms. Therefore, the Secured Lenders had considerable leverage over the
Debtors. The Secured Lenders could use that leverage to ensure that the Schwabs quickly sold
233
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their businesses and agreed to statements of fact and conclusions of law that were favorable to
the Secured Lenders. Accordingly, the Secured Lenders were in a good negotiating position at
this point in the case.
The Debtors and the Secured Lenders filed the first agreed cash collateral order on March
24, 2010.237 The Secured Lenders drafted the order to cover a short period of three days: March
24 through 26.238 The terms of the order foreshadowed the eventual terms of the first agreed
order to use cash collateral that would cover a more substantial period.239 Most significantly, the
Debtors acknowledged in paragraph “J” of the order that the Secured Lenders had valid and
perfected security interests in all of the Debtors’ cash collateral generated prior to the petition
date.240 This acknowledgment foreclosed the Debtors’ ability to challenge the enforceability of
the loan documents or otherwise exercise their avoiding powers later in the case.241
Moreover, on April 5, 2010, the Secured Lenders and the Debtors agreed to amend the
cash collateral order.242 Under the amended order, the Debtors were required to remit all of their
bank accounts to the Secured Lenders, excepting a small portion to fund the Debtors’ payroll.243
The Debtors could continue to operate and draw from the accounts only in accordance with a
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pre-approved budget.244 If the Debtors wanted to spend outside of the budget, then they had to
obtain the written consent of the Secured Lenders.245 The budget lasted from March 31, 2010, to
June 21 of that same year and set a spending limit of $1,000,000 prior to the sale of certain noncore assets.246 After the sale of non-core assets, the Debtors’ were authorized to use the proceeds
along with a $3,000,000 refund of life insurance premiums from a life insurance policy held by
the Schwab Family Trust.247
The Debtors also agreed to several terms that ensured that the Secured Lenders remained
adequately protected from any diminution in value.248 First, the Debtors agreed to grant the
Secured Lenders replacement liens and super-priority administrative expense claims, junior only
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to Naples’s priming liens for the $3.5 million of the DIP financing that had already been
approved.249 Second, the Debtors agreed to allow the Secured Lenders ongoing access to the
Debtors’ financial records during regular business hours so that the Secured Lenders could
supervise the Debtors’ compliance with the court’s order. 250 Third, the Debtors agreed to
maintain all current insurance levels on their assets and to refrain from increasing the salaries,
dividends, or benefits of any officers of the company.251
Moreover, the order contained several termination events that were designed to ensure
that the case proceeded as the Secured Lenders desired. For example, the Debtors were required
to file (1) a motion seeking approval of a sale of non-core assets and (2) a motion seeking
approval of a Section 363 sale of substantially all of the Debtors’ assets on the same day as the
cash collateral order.252 In connection with those motions, the Debtors were required to obtain a
binding letter of intent, with no due diligence or financing contingency, and a five (5) percent
earnest deposit for the purchase of substantially all of the Debtors’ assets by April 30, 2010.253
The Debtors were further required to designate a stalking horse bidder and enter into an asset
purchase agreement with that bidder, consistent with the letter of intent, by May 14, 2010.254
Lastly, the Debtors were obligated to conduct an auction by June 2, 2010, and to obtain approval
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of the ensuing sale by June 3, 2010.255 If Debtors’ management failed to meet any of these
deadlines or support the marketing and sale effort, then the Debtors’ authorization to use cash
collateral would correspondingly terminate.256
In compliance with the amended cash collateral order, the Debtors also filed motions to
approve a Section 363 sale and the auction and bidding procedures associated with the sale on
April 5, 2010.257 The Debtors asked the court to approve the sale of all or substantially all of the
Debtors’ assets through a bidding and auction process. 258 The Debtors stated that Section
363(b)(1) allowed a debtor-in-possession to sell substantially all of its assets if the debtor
satisfied certain elements.259 Specifically, the Debtors relied on In re Country Manor of Keaton,
Inc., 172 B.R. 217 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1994), which provided a four-part test requiring the debtor
to demonstrate (1) a sound business reason for the sale, (2) accurate and reasonable notice of the
sale, (3) an adequate sale price, and (4) good faith behavior throughout the sale.260
The Debtors alleged that the value of their businesses was deteriorating because the
Debtors could not afford to finance ongoing operations.261 The Debtors could not fund ongoing
operations without using the Secured Lenders’ cash collateral, and the court’s amended order
255
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authorizing the use of cash collateral required the Debtors to obtain approval of a Section 363
sale and auction process. 262 If the Debtors failed to consummate such an auction, then the
Debtors would lose the ability to use cash collateral and would be forced to liquidate, thereby
significantly lowering the value of the estate.263 Thus, the Debtors alleged that they had a sound
business purpose for seeking approval of the sale.264
Further, the Debtors provided several parties with notice of the motion and asked the
court to bless their efforts as sufficient.265 The Debtors also claimed that the proposed auction
and bidding process would be conducted at arm’s length and in a good faith manner.266 The
Debtors appeared to believe that the proposed bidding process would subject the Debtors’ assets
to a market check, thereby achieving the highest possible price for the assets.267 The Debtors
accordingly asked the court to approve the sale, as they alleged that they had satisfied all of the
elements from In re Country Manor.268
The Debtors wanted to accomplish the sale under Section 363(f), which allows a debtorin-possession to sell assets free and clear of all liens and encumbrances.269 To do so, the Debtors
had to demonstrate that “(i) applicable nonbankruptcy law would permit the sale free and clear of
262
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liens, (ii) the secured lenders had consented, (iii) the value of the sold property exceeds the
aggregate value of the liens, (iv) such interest is in bona fide dispute or (v) the lender could be
forced to accept a money satisfaction of its judgment in a legal or equitable proceeding.”270
Because the requirements of Section 363(f) are disjunctive, the Debtors only had to demonstrate
one of these scenarios.271 In this case, the Secured Lenders wanted an asset sale because the
petition was filed, so the Debtors easily obtained the Secured Lenders’ consent.272 Therefore, the
Debtors moved the court to grant the sale of the Debtors’ assets free and clear of any liens,
claims, and interests, except to the extent expressly assumed by the successful bidder.273
The Debtors’ original bidding procedures motion provided the actual terms of the sale.
Under the bidding procedures, the Debtors had to designate a stalking horse bidder274 by April
30, 2010.275 The Debtors were able to aggregate partial bids for component assets in order to
compare those bids to a bid on all of their assets.276 The Debtors had to consult with the Secured
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Lenders and the Committee throughout the sales process.277 The proposed assets for sale in the
auction included all of the ready-mix operations in Ohio and Florida, the 2,100-acre plot in
Florida that contained an orange grove and aggregate deposits, and the lease on the deep-water
port in Port Manatee, Florida.278 The Debtors planned to hold the auction on June 2, 2010, at the
office of Hahn Loeser in Cleveland, Ohio.279
Moreover, the Debtors’ bidding procedures motion contained due diligence limitations
and bid requirements that created the process for submitting and processing compliant bids.280
To submit a compliant bid, a bidder had to transmit, in writing, an executed copy of a form asset
purchase agreement to Western Reserve Partners (“Western Reserve”) – the Debtors’ investment
banker – by May 28, 2010, at 17:00.281 Any bidder’s offer had to be irrevocable, and the bidder
had to pay the purchase price in cash.282 The asset purchase agreement set a bid increment of
$100,000 over the sum of the stalking horse’s bid and break-up fee.283 The bidder also had to
provide evidence that it could complete the transaction, either through third-party financing or
some other means, and supply a good faith deposit in the amount of five (5) percent of the
277
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purchase price.284
Under the original bidding procedures, any qualified bid could not be subject to any
financial or due diligence contingency because of the hurried nature of the sale.285 If a bidder
signed a confidentiality agreement, however, the Debtors provided access to some
information.286 For example, Western Reserve maintained an online “data room” that compliant
bidders could access.287 The bidding procedures also granted a compliant bidder with reasonable
access to the Debtors’ financial records and business facilities.288
Several parties in interest filed objections shortly after the Debtors asked the court to
approve the proposed sale and bidding procedures motions. In particular, Port Manatee’s Port
Authority, Holcim, Inc. (“Holcim”), St. Mary’s, Allen Concrete Company (“Allen Concrete”),
and National Lime all filed objections to the proposed sale.289 Ultimately, the Debtors either
resolved the objections or the court overruled the objections prior to the auction of the Debtors’
assets. 290 Looking at the details of each objection, however, provides insight into the sale
process.
The objections by Port Manatee, Holcim, and St. Mary’s all related to the Debtors’
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alleged miscalculation of cure amounts connected with the assumption and assignment of
executory contracts or unexpired leases.291 Port Manatee objected to the Debtors’ calculation of
a cure amount under its deep-water port lease and demanded that any potential bidder provide
adequate assurance of payment under Section 363(f)(2)(B).292 Likewise, Holcim, a supplier of
ready-mix materials, noted that the Debtors planned to assume and assign their executory
contract with ECC and alleged that the Debtors miscalculated the cure amount by close to
$600,000.293 Finally, St. Mary’s contended that the Debtors’ calculation of a cure amount under
an executory contract was off by approximately $60,000.294
In response to these objections, the Debtors claimed that any potential purchaser would
have the financial wherewithal to cure the stated amounts and to continue to adequately perform
under the executory contracts. 295 The Debtors did not contest the creditors’ revisions to the
proposed cure amounts.296 The court accepted the Debtors’ assurances as sufficient to dismiss
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the concerns of the creditors.297 Accordingly, the court did not allow these objections to delay
the proposed sale.298
By contrast, Allen Concrete and National Lime both objected to the rejection or
assignment of specific contracts and leases in the proposed auction. National Lime objected to a
potential purchaser’s ability to reject a lease covering an 18-acre plot in Ohio that the Debtors
had leased to National Lime in 2009.299 National Lime argued that Section 365(h) allowed it to
retain possession.300 Specifically, Section 365(h)(1)(A)(ii) provides that a lessee may retain its
rights for the term of a lease that commenced prior to the trustee’s rejection to the extent nonbankruptcy law allows the lessee to do so.301 National Lime contended that the lease at issue was
crucial to its business and moving would pose an undue hardship.302 National Lime argued that
the property provided easy rail access, contained over $ 1 million in inventory, and met all the
necessary zoning and permit qualifications under state and federal law.303 As such, National
Lime asked the court to allow it to retain possession of the property under the lease, even if a
potential purchaser decided to reject the lease.304
Allen Concrete was a fifty (50) percent partner with Schwab Ready-Mix in a company
297
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called Allen Concrete Pumping.305 Allen Concrete had a right of first refusal for Schwab ReadyMix’s partnership interest under their partnership agreement.306 Allen Concrete objected to the
inclusion of the partnership interest in the proposed sale if the Debtors did not offer the interest
to Allen Concrete first or seek Allen Concrete’s consent to assign the interest.307
Again, the Debtors were able to convince the court that these objections should not stall
the sale process. The Debtors argued that National Lime misunderstood the law surrounding
Section 365(h). Specifically, the Debtors contended that National Lime would not be able to
retain possession under non-bankruptcy law—ergo, it should not maintain possession under
Section 365(h). 308 The Debtors claimed that Ohio law allowed a mortgagee to foreclose on
property subject to a lease if the mortgage was recorded prior to the lease and the mortgagee
gave the lessee proper notice.309 Therefore, KeyBank would have been able to foreclose on the
property with notice under Ohio law because KeyBank’s mortgage on the property was recorded
prior to the lease with National Lime.310 The Debtors contended that National Lime should be
afforded adequate protection at most, but its lease interest should not stall the sale efforts. 311 By
contrast, the Debtors agreed not to include the partnership interest in Allen Concrete Pumping in
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the sale, thereby rendering Allen Concrete’s objection moot.312
Further, the Committee and the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (“PBGC”) filed
objections to the bidding procedure motion.313 Neither objection proved substantial enough to
change any part of the eventual bidding process.

The Committee objected to the lack of

specificity in the bidding procedures regarding the stalking horse bidder’s break-up fee.314 The
Committee reserved its right to object in the future if that fee was purposefully set high enough
to chill bidding.315 The PBGC contended that the Debtors failed to provide any information to
potential bidders about the Debtors’ underfunded pension plan.316 The PBGC asked the court to
include such information in the eventual asset purchase agreement to ensure that a potential
purchaser would be able to assume approximately $3.2 million in pension liabilities.317
The Debtors successfully resolved both of these objections. The Committee reserved its
right to object to the stalking horse bidder on any grounds, including the eventual break-up fee or
the assignment of any executory contracts.318 The PBGC withdrew its objection because the
Debtors agreed to include information about its pension liabilities in the form asset purchase

312
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PBGC Obj. to Bidding Procedures, Doc. No. 268; Committee’s Obj. to Bidding Procedures,
Doc. No. 270.
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agreement.319 The Debtors’ estate later settled PBGC’s by granting PBGC administrative claims
and priority claims under Section 507(b)(5) in the amount of $453,113.320 With these objections
resolved, on April 16, 2010, the court approved the bidding and auction procedures for the sale
of the Debtors’ core assets.321
The Secured Lenders and the Debtors filed a final cash collateral order on April 15, 2010.
This order largely mirrored the language of the amended order but did contain some
differences.322 Significantly, the final order allowed the Debtors to sell certain hauling trucks
located in Florida without the supervision of the court, so long as the Debtors received at least
$650,000 for the trucks.323 The order also acknowledged the validity and nonavoidability of the
Secured Lenders’ interests in its collateral, excepting only the Committee’s right to investigate
and challenge these claims.324
The court-approved budget attached to the final cash collateral order highlighted the
financial status of the Debtors at this point in the case. 325 The Debtors projected a negative
operating cash flow for three out of the four weeks between March 20, 2010, and April 10,
2010.326 Overall, for the period between March and October, the Debtors projected that they
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would operate with a negative $2,640,000 cash flow. 327

Payroll, freight and fuel, and

professional fees were the three highest expenses on the Debtors’ balance sheet.328 The Debtors
projected $3,234,000 in professional fees related to the cost of the bankruptcy case.329
Subsequently, the Committee filed an objection to the Secured Lenders’ interest in the
hauling trucks that the court authorized the Debtors to quickly sell in the final cash collateral
order.330 The Committee discovered that the Secured Lenders made a mistake in perfecting their
security interest in the trucks. Under Florida Statute 319.27, a lender must note its liens on the
title certificate of a vehicle to perfect its security interest in that vehicle. 331 The Committee
produced copies of the titles of the trucks that the Secured Lenders claimed as collateral, but the
titles did not contain any notation of the Secured Lenders’ interests. 332 The Committee
accordingly argued that those trucks could not be sold because they were not part of the Secured
Lenders’ pre-petition collateral.333
The Committee’s objection proved ultimately correct. The Secured Lenders failed to
perfect their security interests on several pieces of inventory, thereby lowering the amount of
collateral available to satisfy the Debtors’ obligations.334 This failure by the Secured Lenders
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highlights the importance of ensuring compliance with state laws regarding perfecting secured
transactions. A single financing statement might not always cover every piece of inventory.
Now, the Secured Lenders had to worry about their security interests in every vehicle located in
Florida.

334

See Fla. Stat. § 319.27.
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V. The Sales Process – Part II

On or before April 28, 2010, the Debtors received a compliant bid from Atlas Holdings
and Garmark Partners, doing business together as Cement Resources. 335 Once the Debtors
received the compliant bid, they filed a motion to revise the proposed bidding and auction
procedures.336 After this motion, the Debtors’ relationship with the Committee began to unravel,
as the Debtors, Secured Lenders, and Cement Resources appeared to collude to the detriment of
unsecured creditors.
The Debtors agreed to seek approval for the modification of the bidding procedures for
the benefit of Cement Resources, so long as Cement Resources promised the Debtors’ insiders
future employment and equity in the new company. 337 Then, the Secured Lenders agreed to give
the Debtors $2,000,000 of post-petition financing because the Debtors did not want to obtain a
refund on life insurance premiums, which would have terminated the Debtors’ insiders as
beneficiaries under the $7 million policies.338 In return, the Debtors agreed to grant valid and
perfected security interests on unencumbered assets339 that the Secured Lenders had previously
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Debtors’ Rev. Bidding Procedures Motion, Doc. No. 344, at p. 6.
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See id. at p. 10 n.5, 12.
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Second Motion for Post-Petition Financing, Doc. No. 369, at p. 3–4; Committee Obj. to
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Those unencumbered assets included a fleet of hauling trucks located in Florida, a tax refund,
and deposit accounts. Committee Obj. to Second Motion for Post-Petition Financing, Doc. No.
377, at p. 5. The total amount of the unencumbered assets was approximately $10 million. Id.
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failed to perfect.340
Therefore, the court faced a major turning point in the case. Up until this time, all parties
had managed to refrain from self-dealing and collusion—at least on the surface. After a stalking
horse bidder was chosen, however, the Debtors finally gave into the temptation to insert perhaps
unwarranted benefits into the sales process in hopes that the court would overlook any inequity
in the interest of efficiency and finality.
A. The Revised Bidding and Auction Procedures
Atlas Holdings and Garmark Partners formed Cement Resources as a shell corporation
solely for the purpose of purchasing the Debtors.341 The company originally approached the
Debtors in mid-April 2010 and asked to negotiate the deal outside of bankruptcy court.342 Due to
the constraints in the amended cash collateral order, the Debtors were obviously unable to
perform a private negotiation.343 Therefore, the Debtors asked Cement Resources if it would
serve as the stalking horse bidder.344 Cement Resources agreed, and the Debtors subsequently
filed a revised motion to approve certain bidding and auction procedures.345
On April 30, 2010, the Debtors’ board of directors met and discussed the sales process.346
The meeting lasted for about two hours, and the Debtors’ legal counsel and investment bankers
340
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presented information on the revised bidding procedures. 347

At the conclusion of these

presentations, the Debtors’ board approved the revised bidding procedure motion and the
designation of Cement Resources as the stalking horse bidder. 348 Significantly, the Debtors’
board of directors was comprised entirely of four members of the Schwab family, who owned all
of the equity in the different businesses.349 Because Cement Resources was a shell corporation
with no existing concrete, ready-mix, or cement operations and no management structure in
place, the company approached the Schwabs prior to the board meeting about the possibility of
allowing them to retain management positions in the new company. 350 Further, Cement
Resources also discussed giving the Schwabs a minority equity position in the new firm in
exchange for certain assets that the Schwab family personally owned. 351 Therefore, the board’s
approval of the sale and bidding procedures was not at all surprising, given that the Schwab
family hoped to obtain handsome benefits from the stalking horse bidder.
The Debtors also executed an asset purchase agreement with Cement Resources, which
mimicked the Cement Resources bid proposal, in the revised bidding procedure motion. 352
Cement Resources agreed to pay the Debtors $48,350,000 in cash, plus a reimbursement of up to
$2 million to the Secured Lenders for proposed financing that would help the Debtors cover

347

Id.

348

Id.

349

Id. at 10 n.5.

350

Id.

351

Id.

352

Id.

60

expenses throughout the sale. 353 Cement Resources agreed to purchase all of the Debtors’
businesses, including some non-core assets, which the Debtors did not auction in the previous
non-core asset sale.354
Cement Resources also agreed to assume several liabilities of the Debtors. For example,
it agreed to assume up to $602,000 of § 503(b)(9) claims as well as up to $750,000 of postpetition trade payables.355 The § 503(b)(9) claims consisted of the value of any goods that the
Debtors received in the ordinary course of business within 20 days of the commencement of the
case and were subject to a vendor’s reclamation.356 Cement Resources also agreed to pay any
cure costs associated with the assumption or assignment of executory contracts.357 In return,
Cement Resources granted the Schwabs the right to receive annual earn-out payments equal to
twenty (20) percent of the net profits attributable to (1) the mining of the Debtors’ quarry in
Florida or (2) the sale of any validly permitted mining rights to that property. 358
Moreover, Cement Resources received solid protections that were not provided to any
potential stalking horse bidder in the original bidding procedures motion.

First, the asset

purchase agreement required the Debtors to pay a variable break-up fee to Cement Resources if
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Cement Resources could not purchase the Debtors. 359 For instance, Cement Resources was
entitled to a four (4) percent fee – which would total around $2 million – if another company
outbid it at the auction.360 Cement Resources was also entitled to an expenses reimbursement of
up to $750,000.361 Second, the Debtors agreed to move the auction to May 17, 2010, from June
2, 2010. 362 Cement Resources presumably wanted this change to chill bidding, although the
Debtors argued that it was necessary to prevent the need for further post-petition indebtedness.363
Third, the Debtors’ proposed bidding procedures would require potential purchasers to submit
bids for all of the Debtors’ assets.364 The Debtors probably eliminated the partial bid option to
make submission of a compliant bid more difficult.
The Debtors also discussed the marketing efforts of their investment banker in the revised
bidding procedures motion. The Debtors reported the following marketing activity:


Western Reserve contacted 283 potential bidders,



Western Reserve sent “teaser” information to at least 201 potential bidders,



Western Reserve sent confidentiality agreements to 212 potential bidders,



56 potential bidders executed confidentiality agreements and received more
specific information, and
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Only three potential purchasers submitted compliant bids.365

The Committee and several other creditors filed objections to the proposed revisions to
the bidding procedures. Most of the creditors objected to reserve their rights to challenge stated
cure amounts or to challenge the assumption of unexpired leases and executory contracts. 366 The
Committee’s and National Lime’s objections, however, challenged the potential collusion
between the Debtors and Cement Resources. 367 The Committee claimed that the three main
protections afforded to Cement Resources would stifle any further bidding, thereby capping the
amount the Debtors could receive in the sale.368 The Committee alleged specifically that (1) the
break-up fee was too high, (2) the new procedures prevented “basket bids” (the combination of
two partial bids), (3) the stalking horse offered kickbacks to the Schwabs, and (4) the shortened
auction process was unjustified. 369 The Committee argued that these modifications stifled
competitive bidding and called into question the Debtors’ faithfulness to the estate. 370 The
Committee accordingly asked the court to deny the motion.371
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See Nat’l Obj. to Rev. Bidding, Doc. No. 279, at p. 2–4. National Lime specifically pointed out
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Judge Kendig ultimately found a middle ground between the Debtors’ requests and the
Committee’s objections. Judge Kendig approved the revised bidding procedures motion on May
14, 2010, but the judge changed some important features of the sales process. 372 For example,
the court set the auction for May 27, 2010, which was ten (10) days later than the requested
date. 373 Further, the court required the Debtors to entertain “basket bids” instead of only
accepting individual bids for the entire business. 374 The court approved the asset purchase
agreement with no substantial changes, however, including the four (4) percent break-up fee, the
bid increment of $100,000 over the purchase price and break-up fee, and the ability of the
Debtors to sell the assets without any warranties.375 Moreover, the court found that the Debtors
had diligently marketed the sale and had exercised good business judgment by changing the
bidding procedures.376 Therefore, the court rejected the Committee’s concern about the Debtors’
collusion with Cement Resources.
B. Post-Petition Financing and Other Loose Ends
During the contest over the revisions to the bidding procedures, the Debtors filed a
motion for post-petition financing on May 3, 2010.377 The Debtors asked the court to approve up
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to $2,000,000 of additional financing from the Secured Lenders under Section 364(c) and (d).378
Therefore, the Debtors’ obligations under the deal would be secured by (1) first-priority liens on
unencumbered assets, (2) liens senior in priority to all except EFO Financial and Naples’s
priming lien, and (3) administrative expense claims.379
The Debtors alleged that the funds would be used to pay professional fees, purchase
inventory, and pay general corporate expenses until the sale of all their assets closed. 380 With the
consent of the Secured Lenders and the stalking horse bidder, the Debtors had failed to obtain a
$3 million refund of insurance premiums in violation of the final cash collateral order. 381 The
Debtors argued that the available cash collateral, without the insurance refund, was not enough to
continue operating their businesses.382 As such, the Debtors contended that without post-petition
financing, they would have to shut down their businesses, thereby causing irreparable harm to
the bankruptcy estate.383
The terms of the financing contained significant advantages for both the Secured Lenders
and the Debtors. The Debtors would receive the money in two stages: one advance after an
interim order and a second advance after a final order. 384 The first advance constituted a
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majority of the overall funds, totaling $1,400,000.385 Further, the Debtors had to pay a $60,000
closing fee on the loan, which was relatively low compared to the fees on the previous financing
deal with EFO Financial and Naples. 386 The only conditions on the loan were the court’s
approval of an interim order, the lack of any materially adverse change in the Debtors’ business
operations, and payment of the closing fee.387
In return for the loan advances, the Secured Lenders would receive a first-priority lien on
previously unencumbered assets. 388 The Secured Lenders’ request for liens on previously
unencumbered assets was significant because the Secured Lenders had failed to perfect their
security interests in several pieces of the Debtors’ inventory. 389 Further, the Debtors asked the
court to require EFO Financial and Naples to satisfy the proceeds of their claims first from assets
not subject to the Secured Lenders’ liens or claims.390 The Debtors agreed to waive any rights to
challenge the validity and nonavoidability of any of the Secured Lenders’ security interests in the
Debtors’ assets, regardless of whether the security interests were granted pre- or post-petition.391
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Therefore, the Secured Lenders used the post-petition financing motion as an opportunity to
insulate their position vis-à-vis the other creditors by expanding their collateral and protecting
their liens.
The Committee filed an objection to the Debtors’ second post-petition financing motion
on May 9, 2010.392 The Committee argued that the Debtors were involved in a form of selfdealing that violated their fiduciary duty of loyalty to the estate.393 The Committee alleged that
the Debtors needed financing solely because the Schwabs refused to obtain an insurance
refund. 394 The Schwabs wanted to avoid obtaining the refund because the insurance refund
would extinguish their rights as beneficiaries under the policy and would cause adverse tax
consequences.395 In fact, the Schwab family had already attempted to obtain a loan against the
policy, but one of the Secured Lenders, Huntington, denied the loan, thereby creating the current
cash flow dilemma.396
Further, the Committee claimed that the Secured Lenders had unknowingly failed to
perfect their security interests in at least $10 million worth of collateral, including hundreds of
motor vehicles, a tax refund, and deposit accounts. 397 The Debtors’ motion would grant the
Secured Lenders’ new liens, which were automatically valid and enforceable under the attached
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order, in these assets.398 Therefore, the Committee asserted that the post-petition financing deal
inequitably favored the Secured Lenders at the expense of unsecured creditors.399
The court issued an interim order approving the first advance of $1,400,000 of postpetition financing on May 14, 2010.400 The court found that the Debtors complied with their
fiduciary duties while negotiating the DIP facility with the Secured Lenders. 401 Further, the
court stated that the financing arrangement was in the best interests of all the parties involved in
the case, including the unsecured creditors.402 The court also concluded that the Debtors acted in
good faith and afforded the transaction the protection of statutory mootness under Section
364(e).403 Therefore, the court overruled the Committee’s objection and allowed the Debtors to
receive secured financing in lieu of obtaining the insurance refund, as the final cash collateral
order required.404
The court’s conclusion that the financing arrangement was in the best interests of all
parties appears incorrect. The Committee had discovered mistakes in the Secured Lenders’
efforts to perfect security interests in valuable collateral, which increased the likelihood of
meaningful recovery for unsecured creditors in a case that already appeared grim for that class of
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creditors. 405 The court appeared to ignore the unsecured class when it granted the Secured
Lenders’ valid and perfected security interests in unencumbered assets, thus allowing the
Secured Lenders to cure mistakes in securing their collateral.406
Further, the Debtors’ proposed need for post-petition financing at this stage in the case
was not entirely satisfactory. The Schwabs failed to obtain a $3 million insurance refund, which
was a requirement of the final cash collateral order, because they did not want to pay higher
income taxes or lose the benefit of the policy.407 Therefore, the Debtors could have resolved the
issue without further impairing the unsecured creditors by obtaining the refund, as all the parties
originally agreed.
Nevertheless, the court’s order did not completely favor the Debtors’ and Secured
Lenders’ position. The Court did not accept the Secured Lenders’ request to marshal EFO
Financial’s and Naples’s priming liens. Instead, the interim order reserved all parties’ rights to
marshal liens and to determine the source of payments to EFO Financial and Naples. 408
Moreover, despite any other conclusion of fact or law in the order, the court preserved any
party’s ability to challenge the Debtors’ compliance with their fiduciary duties throughout the
negotiations for the DIP loan.409
In April and May 2010, the Debtors also resolved two other motions that were unrelated
to the sale process. Specifically, the Cavaliers Holding Company filed a motion to compel the
405
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assumption or rejection of an unexpired license agreement for a suite at Quicken Loans Arena,
and Ohio Farmers Insurance Company (“Farmers”) filed a motion for relief from the stay to
terminate a surety bond.410
The Debtors owned a license to use suite 233 at the Quicken Loans Arena under a license
agreement with the Cavaliers Holding Company.411 The Debtors fell behind on payments under
the license agreement in the amount of $400,000.412 The Cavaliers Holding Company asked the
court to compel the Debtors to assume or reject the license agreement and immediately to cure
the deficient amount because the Cavaliers hoped to capture the demand for the suite in the
upcoming 2010 NBA playoffs. 413 The Debtors argued that the license agreement was an
attractive, unique asset that could increase a potential purchaser’s bid amount in the upcoming
sale.414 The Debtors accordingly asked the court to include the license agreement as an asset in
the Section 363 sale.415
On April 29, 2010, the parties entered into a settlement and filed an order resolving the
Cav.’s Motion to Compel Assumption or Rejection of Lease, Doc. No. 230; Farmers’ Motion
for Relief from Stay, Doc. No. 291.
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matter.416 The Cavaliers Holding Company was allowed to sublicense the suite during the 2010
NBA playoffs but had to pay the Debtors three (3) percent of any revenue generated from the
sublicense.417 The settlement also gave the Cavaliers Holding Company an unsecured claim for
$100,000, though the Cavaliers Holding Company waived any right to assert an administrative
expense claim for any cure amount later in the case. 418 Lastly, the Debtors agreed to file a
motion to compel assumption or rejection of the license within two (2) weeks of the closing of
the Section 363 sale.419
Farmers issued a contract performance bond to the Debtors on behalf of the City of
Strongsville, as the obligee, prior to the commencement of the bankruptcy case.420 The Debtors
would not have been able to obtain a supply and construction contract with the Strongsville
without the pre-petition bond.421 Farmers moved for relief from the automatic stay under Section

416

Order Resolving Motion to Compel, Doc. No. 325, p. 1.

417

Id. at p. 2.

418

Id.

419

Id.

420

Farmers’ Motion for Relief from Stay, Doc. No. 291, p. 2. Under Ohio law, a contractor is
required to obtain a “bid bond” from a surety company that is automatically converted into a
combined payment and performance bond. James D. Fullerton, Construction Law Survival
Manual in MANUAL OF CREDIT AND COMMERCIAL LAW, 631 (104th ed. 2013). The state
government requires the contractor to obtain such a performance bond because it shifts the risk
of completion from the government – that is, the taxpayers – to the surety company. Id. at 610.
A performance bond guarantees the obligee that the principal will complete the contract
according to its terms. Id. If the principal fails to do so, as the Debtors did, then the obligee can
sue both the principal and the surety company or request the surety company to ensure the
completion of the contract through either the original contractor or a new contractor. Id.
421

Farmers’ Motion for Relief from Stay, Doc. No. 291, at p. 2.
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362(d) to terminate the pre-petition bond, arguing that it had demonstrated “cause” to do so.422
In particular, Farmers argued “cause” existed because the Debtors could not assign the bond and
because the Debtors had failed to pay the premiums on the bond.423
The court granted Farmers’ motion and allowed it to terminate the bond after the
completion of the sale.424 After Farmers terminated the pre-petition bond, the court authorized
the Debtors to obtain a new post-petition bond from Farmers under Section 363(c), but the
Debtors were required to pay overdue premiums and execute a new indemnity agreement in
order to do so.425 If Farmers had to pay any of the obligations under the post-petition bond prior
to the sale, then Farmers would receive an administrative expense claim of equivalent value.426
C. Final Approval of the Sale
A week prior to the auction, the Committee filed another objection to the proposed sale
and bidding process.427 The Committee doubted the legitimacy of the sales process because the
Debtors continued to promote the stalking horse bidder, Cement Resources, at the expense of
allegedly higher bids. 428 The Committee claimed that the Debtors received two competing
“basket bids” that were valued ten (10) percent higher than Cement Resources’ bid.429 Yet, the

422

Id. at p. 8–10.

423

Id.

424

Order Granting Farmers Relief from Stay, Doc. No. 403, at p. 1.

425

Id. at p. 2.

426

Id. at p. 3.

427

See Committee’s Obj. to Sale Motion, Doc. No. 434.

428

Id. at p. 2.
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Debtors had failed to qualify these bids for the auction, according to the Committee. 430 The
Committee argued that the Debtors wanted a “sham auction process” that was designed to ensure
Cement Resources’ success rather than obtain the highest market value for the Debtors’ assets.431
The Committee alleged that the Debtors had an incentive to do so because Cement Resources
had offered the Schwab family post-sale employment and an equity stake in the new company.432
Thus, the Committee asked the court to prevent the Debtors from consummating the sale.433
The Debtors moved to strike the Committee’s objection under Bankr. R. P. 7012 by
alleging that it contained materially false information.434 The Debtors denied all of the damaging
allegations in the Committee’s objection, except for the claims relating to the Debtors’ insiders’
potential benefits from the Cement Resources deal. 435 The Debtors continued to maintain,
however, that Cement Resources was named as the stalking horse bidder because of the quality
of its bid and not because of the prerequisites it offered to the Schwab family.436
Ultimately, the Committee’s objection was withdrawn prior to the auction. 437 The
auction was conducted on May 27, 2010, and the court issued a final order approving the sale of

429

Id.

430

Id.

431

Id.

432

Id. at p. 2–3.

433

See id. at 17.

434

See Debtors’ Motion to Strike Committee Obj. to Sale, Doc. No. 439, at p. 1–2.

435

See Id. at p. 3–4.

436

See Id. at p. 3.

437

Final Order Approving Sale, Doc. No. 455, at p. 21.
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all of the Debtors’ assets to the successful bidder the following day.438
Seven bidders participated in the auction at Debtors’ counsel’s offices in Cleveland,
Ohio.439 The auction was conducted in two separate stages.440 First, the Debtors accepted bids
on “component assets” of the Debtors’ businesses.441 Then, the Debtors determined whether any
combination of those partial bids would exceed Cement Resources’ $48,350,000 offer.442 The
Debtors identified that the combination of OldCastle Materials, Inc.’s (“OldCastle”) and
Resource Land Holdings’s bids collectively exceeded Cement Resources’s bid.443 Second, the
Debtors accepted bids on “all of the Debtors’ assets.”444 Only five bidders participated in this
portion of the auction, and, at its conclusion, the Debtors named OldCastle and Resource Land
Holdings as the successful bidders.445 As such, Cement Resources ultimately lost the bidding
war at the auction, even though it had spent months courting the Debtors to favor its position.
OldCastle and Resource Land Holdings purchased the Debtors’ businesses for
$57,822,181.446 The purchase price included $54,032,614 of cash and $3,789,559 of non-cash

438

Id. at p. 12, 23.

439

Id. at p. 12.

440

Id.

441

Id.

442

Id.

443

Id.

444

Id. at p. 12–13.

445

Id. at p. 13.

446

Id.
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consideration. 447 OldCastle purchased all of the Debtors’ ready-mix operations in Ohio and
Florida, whereas Resource Land Holdings purchased the Debtors’ Florida real estate containing
potential limestone deposits.448 Resource Land Holdings agreed to pay the Schwab family “earnout” payments that were keyed to revenue generated from mining operations on the Florida
properties.449 The successful bidders had to pay Cement Resources a break-up fee of $1,900,000
pursuant to the revised bidding procedures that the court had approved in early May.450
The Secured Lenders agreed to carve out funds from its collateral to pay the fees of the
Debtors’ and the Committee’s professionals.451 The Secured Lenders specifically allowed the
Debtors’ counsel, Hahn Loeser, to collect $575,000 of its fees out of the Secured Lenders’
collateral.452 The Secured Lenders additionally agreed to waive any deficiency claims that it
may have had against the Debtors’ estate under Section 506(a).453 Moreover, the court required
the Debtors to pay several professional fees out of the purchase price from the sale. For
example, the Debtors had to pay their investment banker, Western Reserve, $942,000 of fees
related to its services throughout the sales process.454 The Debtors were also required to pay

447

Id. at p. 12–13.

448

Id.; see also Western Reserve Partners, http://wesrespartners.com/schwab-industries-inc-2/
(last visited Apr. 23, 2016).
449

Final Order Approving Sale, Doc. No. 455, at p. 13–14.

450

Id. at p. 15.

451

Id. at p. 22.

452

Id. at p. 22–23.

453

Id.

454

Id. at p. 20.
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Hahn Loeser $2,064,000 for legal services provided to the bankruptcy estate.455
Additionally, the court made a series of significant findings that ensured the finality of
the sale process. First, the court found that the asset purchase agreement was negotiated in good
faith and that the sale process was thereby entitled to protection under Section 363(m). 456
Second, the court allowed the sale to occur free and clear of any liens, encumbrances, or
successor liability.457 Third, the court found that the sale did not constitute a sub rosa plan or a
de facto merger.458 Finally, the court granted the Debtors’ the ability to assign or assume all of
the executory contracts submitted to the court and all applicable parties in interest, provided that
the buyer cured any deficient amount.459
The court’s rulings on the sub rosa plan, de facto merger, and successor liability require
further elaboration. A sub rosa plan occurs when a debtor-in-possession attempts to accomplish
what a plan would otherwise accomplish through a Section 363 sale order, thereby usurping the
requirements of a plan under Section 1129.460 For example, a debtor might include a scheme for

455

Id. at p. 39.

456

Id. at p. 28; see 11 U.S.C. § 363(m). Section 363(m) provides that the reversal or
modification on appeal of an authorization to sell property of the estate under Sections 363(b)
and (c) does not affect the validity of a sale or lease to an entity that purchased such property in
good faith. Id. Put simply, Section 363(m) renders statutorily moot a reversal or modification of
a Section 363 sale if the Court finds that the sales process was conducted in good faith.
457

Final Order Approving Sale, Doc. No. 455, at p. 17–19.

458

Id. at p. 15.

459

Id. at p. 19.

460

11 U.S.C. §§ 363 & 1229; KUNEY & BERNSTEIN, supra note 66, at 259.
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the payment of creditors in a sale order.461 If the court had determined that the sale was a sub
rosa plan, then the Debtors would not have been able to complete the sale.462 Therefore, the
court’s ruling here was significant in that it demonstrated that the Debtors were not attempting to
usurp the Code’s procedural protections for plan confirmation through a sale order.463
De facto merger and successor liability protections are somewhat related. Successor
liability is a non-bankruptcy law doctrine that binds an acquirer of a business to the liabilities of
a target – or acquired – business.464 The de facto merger doctrine allows a party to challenge an
acquisition by arguing that the “substance” of the transaction results in a merger, notwithstanding
the “label” that the parties supply for the transaction. 465 If the party succeeds in such a
recharacterization, then the purchaser of the assets may be subject to potential successor liability,
as well as other claims.466
In this case, the court enjoined any future successor liability claims,467 even from parties

461

KUNEY & BERNSTEIN, supra note 66, at 259.

462

See In re Braniff Airways Inc., 700 F.2d 935 (5th Cir. 1983).

463

See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1124, 1125 & 1129(a).

464

KUNEY & BERNSTEIN, supra note 9, at 259.

465

Joan MacLeod Heminway, Basic Corporate Changes in BUSINESS ENTERPRISES: LEGAL
STRUCTURES, GOVERNANCE, AND POLICY, 823 (2d ed. 2012).
466

Id. at 823–24.

467

The court provided the following non-exclusive list of potential successor liability claims that
were enjoined: (1) claims arising under employment or labor agreements; (2) claims arising
under a deed of trust or security interest; (3) any pension, welfare, compensation, or employeebenefit claims; (4) “any other employee, worker’s compensation, occupational disease or
unemployment or temporary disability related claim”; (5) “any products liability claims”; (6)
“reclamation, environmental, or other claims arising from conditions existing on or prior to the
closing” of the sale; (7) claims arising from “any bulk sales or similar law”; (8) tax statutes or
ordinances; (9) claims arising under “any theory of anti-trust”; and (10) any common-law
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that did not have notice or participate in the case, and determined that the sale was not a de facto
merger. 468

Therefore, the court provided the purchasers with significant protection from

liabilities that could have arisen after the closing of the sale.
D. Motion to Vacate
On July 27, 2010, FLSmidth Inc. (“FLS”), an unsecured creditor of ECC, moved the
court to vacate the sale order entered on May 28, 2010.469 Based domestically in Pennsylvania
and headquartered in Denmark, FLS is an engineering firm that supplies equipment, services,
and expertise to the cement and minerals industries internationally.470 As a creditor of both ECC
and non-debtor Eastern Portland Cement Corporation (“Eastern Portland”), FLS was the
principal obligor and guarantor of Eastern Portland’s obligations pursuant to a promissory note
issued in February 2010.471 In its motion, FLS argued that, unknown to the court, the assets sold
pursuant to the sale order included receivables owned by Eastern Portland and were thus beyond
the court’s jurisdiction.472 FLS followed by requesting that the court order an accounting so that
all of Eastern Portland’s assets that were sold could be identified and repaid. 473 Joined by
OldCastle, KeyBank, and the Committee, the Debtors objected, arguing that FLS had notice of
doctrine of de facto merger or successor liability. Final Order Approving Sale, Doc. No. 455, at
p. 17–19.
468

Id. at p. 15, 17–19.

469

FLS’s Motion to Vacate Sale Order, Doc. No. 564, at p. 1.

470

About, FLSmidth, http://www.flsmidth.com/en-us/about+flsmidth (last visited Apr. 25, 2016).

471

FLS’s Motion to Vacate Sale Order, Doc. No. 564, at p. 1–2.

472

Id.

473

Id. at p. 2.
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the entirety of the sale process and, in doing so, emphasized the social impact of the sale: that the
sale saved jobs and created stability for employees and the entire communities that the Debtors’
businesses serviced. 474 The Committee based its objection primarily in arguing that FLS’s
motion resulted from its own failure to act diligently and in a timely fashion, thus resulting in its
assertion of illusory rights and failing to qualify for relief under Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, via Bankruptcy Rule 9024, 475 which ultimately permits relief in cases of
mistake, inadvertence, excusable neglect, newly discovered evidence, or fraud.476
KeyBank reiterated that FLS’s request was overbroad and without meritorious legal
backing.477 Following a hearing on October 5, 2010, Judge Kendig approved FLS’s proposed
settlement agreement and release, in which the Debtors would pay $45,000 to FLS. 478
Conversely, the Debtors were entitled to the following payments pursuant to the agreement: (1)
$9,000 from OldCastle, (2) $9,000 from funds held by Freeborn & Peters for the unsecured
creditors, and (3) $9,000 from KeyBank.479 The court also noted that it retained jurisdiction to
enforce the agreement. 480 While FLS could have upset the entire sale agreement, all parties
appeared to have the foresight and sense to make concessions to prevent the case from
Debtors’ Objection to FLS’s Motion to Vacate Sale Order, Doc. No. 627, at p. 1; OldCastle’s
Objection to FLS’s Motion to Vacate Sale Order, Doc. No. 628, at p. 1; Committee’s Objection
to FLS’s Motion to Vacate Sale Order, Doc. No. 629, at p. 1; KeyBank’s Objection to FLS’s
Motion to Vacate Sale Order, Doc. No. 631, at p. 1.
474

475

Committee’s Objection to FLS’s Motion to Vacate Sale Order, Doc. No. 629, at p. 2–3.

476

KUNEY & BERNSTEIN, supra note 66, at 338.

477

KeyBank’s Objection to FLS’s Motion to Vacate Sale Order, Doc. No. 631, at p. 2–4.

478

Agreed Order Regarding FLS’s Motion to Vacate Sale Order, Doc. No. 671, at p. 8.

479

Id. at p. 9.

480

Id. at p. 2.

79

essentially unraveling as a result of one fairly insignificant third party’s claim to its small share
as a result of inactivity and oversight.
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VI. The Chapter 11 Plan

“Obviously it was a highly complicated case . . . .” –Judge Kendig481
A. First Draft of the Chapter 11 Plan and Disclosure Statement
On October 12, 2010, Schwab Industries and the Committee filed the Joint Plan of
Liquidation, followed by the Disclosure Statement pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 1125, detailing the
summary of claims.482 The claims included the following: administrative claims, priority tax
claims, priority claims, secured claims, general unsecured claims, and equity securities. In
detailing the implementation of the plan, the Disclosure Statement explained how the liquidation
was to be funded, its effective date, and the process for issuing a structured dismissal of the
case.483 More specifically, the Debtors alleged that the plan provided for the following:

481

The transcript of the confirmation hearing revealed that Judge Kendig was irritated with the
case by the time it hit the plan confirmation process, and his frustration likely affected the
outcomes of several issues that arose leading up to confirmation. Transcript of December 9,
2010 Amended Plan Confirmation Hearing, Doc. No. 743, at p. 19.
482

Chapter 11 Plan, Doc. No 646, at p. 1; Disclosure Statement, Doc. No. 657, at p. 1, 7–12.

483

Structured dismissals are a somewhat controversial topic in modern bankruptcy law, as the
Code does not expressly provide for it. “Structured dismissals provide parties with an expedited
means to distribute the sale proceeds to creditors and dispose of the bankruptcy case following
the sale.” 2011 Norton Ann. Surv. of Bankr. Law 1. Some courts, namely the Third Circuit,
provide for the mechanism “[a]s an alternative to a plan of liquidation . . . permit[ting] the debtor
or Chapter 11 trustee to request the approval of distribution mechanisms for any sale proceeds
and other administrative provisions in an order dismissing the Chapter 11 case under Section
346.” Plan of Liquidation, Adv. Ch. Eleven Bankr. Prac. § 10.3 (2016) (citing In re Strategic
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the liquidation of the Debtors’ assets in a manner designed to maximize recoveries to all
creditors;



the formation of a creditor trust, to which the Debtors’ remaining assets would be
transferred. The creditor trust would be charged with liquidating such assets and making
distributions to claim-holders;



cancellation of the Debtors’ existing equity securities; and



structured dismissal of the case if the court determined that the creditor trustee would be
unable to generate sufficient cash proceeds from the liquidation of the Debtors’ assets.484

Regarding the second point as to a creditor trustee, the plan provided that the position would
receive supervision from an oversight committee,485 defined as being “created pursuant to the
Creditor Trust Agreement” and deemed to “have the duties and powers set forth in the Creditor
Trust Agreement.”486 To that end, such a creditor trust agreement was to be executed pursuant to
the plan “as soon as reasonably practicable after the confirmation date among the Debtors, the
Committee[,] and the Creditor Trustee, which shall govern the obligations of the Creditor
Trustee with respect to oversight of the distribution of the Net Proceeds of the Creditor Trust
Assets . . . .”487

Labor, Inc., 467 B.R. 11, 17–18, 25–26 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2012) (“denying debtor's motion
for structured dismissal order and, ultimately, converting the case to one under Chapter 7”)); see
also Creditors' Rights in Bankruptcy § 16:11 (2d ed.).
484

Debtors’ and Committee’s Joint Motion in Support of the Plan, Doc. No. 648, at p. 1–3.

485

Chapter 11 Plan, Doc. No. 646, at p. 4, 6, 8.

486

Id. at p. 6.

487

Id. at p. 4. At the plan confirmation hearing, however, Judge Kendig agreed to edit the
wording in the ensuing order regarding the oversight committee’s role in closing the case. The
edit would change “may” language to “shall,” “[s]o that the Trustee may upon approval of the
oversight committee act in a certain way, it would require the Trustee to act in that way.” This
edit would serve to give the oversight committee a more definite role in distributing the Debtors’
assets. Transcript of December 9, 2010 Amended Plan Confirmation Hearing, Doc. No. 743, at
p. 19.
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Furthermore, the Plan established the following designations for claims and interests:


Class 1 claims – all allowed unsecured priority claims (other than unsecured priority tax
claims);



Class 2 claims – all allowed secured claims of the Secured Lenders;



Class 3 claims – allowed claims of unsecured creditors, which included deficiency claims
of secured creditors; and



Class 4 claims – including interests of equity security holders.488

That same day, the Debtors and the Committee filed the disclosure statement describing the
plan, the Debtors’ chapter 11 case, liquidation, wind-down, and the formation and operation of a
creditor trust that would oversee liquidating assets, pursuing unsecured creditors’ claims,
reconciling those claims, and making distributions on those claims.489 Addressing the somewhat
controversial inclusion of permitting structured dismissal in the plan, the Debtors attempted to
appeal to efficiency by arguing that the Plan would allow structured dismissal of cases if it was
decided that the Creditor Trustee would “be unable to generate sufficient cash proceeds from the
liquidation” to fully pay several substantial claims.490
Overall, the disclosure statement posited that the plan maximized recoveries for all
creditors, although the plan ultimately only benefitted one secured creditor, KeyBank.491 The
Debtors supported the plan by explaining that the creditor trust would receive transfers of myriad
tangible and intangible personal property and would subsequently liquidate those assets and pay

488

Chapter 11 Plan, Doc. No. 646, at p. 9–10.

489

Disclosure Statement, Doc. No. 657, at p. 2.

490

Id.; see supra note 377.

491

Disclosure Statement, Doc. No. 657, at p. 3.
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claims pursuant to the [P]lan, thus providing streamlined, efficient payments.”492 Furthermore,
under the plan, the Debtors’ existing equity securities were to be cancelled, and equity security
holders were not expected to receive distributions.493
B. The Amended Chapter 11 Plan and Disclosure Statement
On October 26, 2010, Debtors and the Committee filed an amended plan, which included
updates regarding payment of administrative expenses and claims. There is no indication in the
record as to what prompted the amendment, but the amended plan specifically provided for a
significant change to Class 2 claims by splitting the category into two subparts:


Class 2a claims – all allowed secured claims of the Secured Lenders;



Class 2b claims – all other secured claims.494
Subsequently, the Debtors and Committee filed a joint motion seeking (1) approval of

procedures for voting on and objecting to the amended plan and amended disclosure statement,
(2) approval of documents regarding the amended disclosure statement and confirmation of the
amended plan, (3) approval of the amended disclosure statement, (4) setting a joint hearing on
the amended disclosure statement, and (5) authorizing and directing them to use certain funds
from the administrative expense fund to pay certain administrative claims. 495

The court

approved the totality of the motion,496 and the Debtors were authorized to use $374,645.64 from

492

Id.

493

Id.

The Debtors likely added this distinction to account for statutory liens, such as mechanics’
liens. Amended Chapter 11 Plan, Doc. No 655, at p. 10.

494

495

Debtors’ and Committee’s Joint Motion in Support of the Plan, Doc. No 648, at p. 1–2.

Order Approving Debtors’ and Committee’s Joint Motion in Support of the Plan, Doc. No
659, at p. 2.
496
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the administrative expense fund to make appropriate payments until December 10, 2010.497

497

Order Granting Use of Administrative Expense Fund to Pay Administrative Claims, Doc. No.
675, at p. 3, 5. Claims due ranged anywhere from around $300 to just under $110,000.
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VII. Objections to Confirmation

A. The IRS’s Objection
The IRS objected to the Debtors’ amended plan because the Debtors had outstanding
federal tax liabilities amounting to $10,563,469.45 as of December 10, 2010, which derived from
audit deficiencies and unfiled federal tax returns. 498 Thus, the IRS objected specifically to
Article V of the amended plan, which permitted payment of unsecured claims before payment of
the IRS’s unsecured priority claim.499 The IRS requested that a date and schedule regarding its
payment.500 Additionally, the IRS cited 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9)(C) in arguing that the amended
plan failed to ensure that payment would be made within five (5) years, as the law requires, and
further argued that the amended plan failed to assert an effective date or describe the nature of
“set aside funds,” particularly in relation to the administrative expense fund.501
B. OldCastle’s Objection
Oldcastle objected to the amended plan on two primary grounds: (1) that the amended
plan proposed an impermissible use of Section 503(b)(9) deposit of funds, which OldCastle
alleged was not the property of the Debtors’ estate, and (2) that the amended plan violated

498

IRS’s Objection to the Plan, Doc. No. 679, at p. 1.

499

Id.

500

Id. at p. 2.

501

Id.
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Section 1129(a)(9)(A).502 As to the first issue, OldCastle contended that the deposit’s remainder
should be refunded to OldCastle, while the amended plan treated the deposit as if were property
of the Debtors’ estate.503 Secondly, OldCastle took issue with amended plan’s omission of a
method for payment of its administrative claims on the amended plan’s effective date. 504
Because the amended plan allowed the Creditor Trustee to retain sole control over the timing of
such payments, OldCastle argued – likely validly (though the court ultimately disagreed) – that
the amended plan violated Section 1129(a)(9)(A), as the effective date was only defined in the
amended plan as “a date not greater than 180 days after the Confirmation Date, unless extended
by the Creditor Trustee in his or her sole discretion . . . .”505
C. Ohio Bureau of Workers’ Compensation Objection
The State of Ohio Department of Taxation and the Ohio Bureau of Workers’
Compensation (“Ohio”) filed an objection alleging that the Debtors left a hole in their approach
to paying priority tax claims pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8) and 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (a)(9)(C),
as the amended plan allowed “for a structured dismissal without payment in full of priority tax
claims,” which could have had the capacity to ultimately prove fatal to the parties’ restructuring

502

Oldcastle’s Objection to the Plan, Doc. No. 681, at p. 3–7.

503

Id. at 3.

504

Id. at 6–7.

505

Id. at 7; see Transcript of December 9, 2010 Amended Plan Confirmation Hearing, Doc. No.
743, at p. 3–4 (noting that the objection was settled and making no reference to Oldcastle’s §
1129(a)(9)(A) deferred payment argument); see also 20.08 TREATMENT OF TAXES, 1999 WL
629362, 3 (“Section 1129(a)(9)(C) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that holders of priority tax
claims may receive payments on a deferred basis over a period of six years.”). In essence,
OldCastle appeared primarily to seek clarification and specification regarding exact dates for
payments.
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efforts, as structured dismissal is not provided for anywhere in the Code.506 Without any further
elaboration, Ohio concluded that Debtors’ plan was not confirmable by the court unless the
amended plan provided for payment of priority tax claims in full.507 Given that the court would
ultimately overrule Ohio’s strong argument against the Debtors’ broad right to structured
dismissal under the amended plan and that the Debtors would provide more complex, convincing
reasons to rule in favor of structured dismissal at the hearing a few months later, Ohio likely
could have benefitted from submitting a more persuasive motion with greater legal research to
back up its position at this stage in the plan process.508
D. Former Schwab Industries Employee’s Objection
Former Schwab Industries employee Timothy Taylor (“Mr. Taylor”), who maintained an
active disability pension claim with the Debtors at the time the bankruptcy case was filed,
objected on the grounds that the Debtors failed to acknowledge that claim or Mr. Taylor as an
interested third party, thus meriting his objection to the amended disclosure statement as to its
incomplete nature.509 Mr. Taylor was not named as a creditor on the amended plan or amended
disclosure statement, thus resulting in his claim that he was wrongfully excluded as an interested

506

Ohio’s Objection to the Plan, Doc. No. 683, at p. 1.

507

Id. at p. 1–2. This objection, totaling three paragraphs, severely lacked in analyzing and
arguing the merits of Ohio’s objection, which was substantively strong with generally broad
legal support.
At the confirmation hearing, the Debtors’ argument was better prepared and more extensive,
which appeared to serve as the primary reason for Judge Kendig’s ruling in their favor,
especially considering his clear exasperation with the parties and overall case. See Transcript of
December 9, 2010 Amended Plan Confirmation Hearing, Doc. No. 743, at p. 18–20.
508

509

Taylor’s Objection to the Plan, Doc. No. 682, at p. 1.
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party.

510

Further, Mr. Taylor provided timely notice, and the Debtors then acted in

acknowledgement of the claim, though failed to act in acknowledgement of his interest as a
creditor in the bankruptcy case.511
E. Allen Concrete’s Objection
Allen Concrete, a third party in interest and subsidiary of the Debtors, objected to the
amended plan and amended disclosure statement after filing a secured claim against the Debtors
for $300,772.50. 512

Taking issue primarily with the contents of the amended disclosure

statement, Allen Concrete argued that it did not include “adequate information” as required
under Section 1125(a)(1).513 Further, Allen Concrete argued that the amended plan should not be
confirmed by the court for two reasons: (1) because the amended plan failed to address Allen
Concrete’s secured possessory lien and several other claims that it had previously asserted, and
(2) because the amended plan failed to meet the requirements under Section 1129(a)(2), (3), (7),
and (8) and Section 1129(b)(1)–(2).514 In its prayer for relief, Allen Concrete requested that the
Debtors amend their amended disclosure statement and amended plan again to rectify the
deficiencies outlined in its objection.515

510

Id. at p. 1–2.

Mr. Taylor’s objection seemed to stem from an apparent administrative oversight on the
Debtors’ behalf. Id.

511

512

Allen Concrete’s Objection to the Plan, Doc. No. 684, at p. 2.

513

Id. at p. 5.

514

Id. at p. 5–9.

515

Id. at p. 10.
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F. Debtors’ Response to the Objections
As the Debtors’ claims, noticing, and balloting agent,516 the Garden City Group filed a
declaration regarding the vote to accept or reject the amended plan. The declaration reiterated
that Classes 2a, including secured claims of Secured Lenders, and 3, including general unsecured
claims, were entitled to vote to accept or reject the amended plan.517 Accordingly, the Garden
City Group reported that of Class 2a, one person voted to accept the amended plan, constituting a
dollar amount voted of $59,193,001.20, and no one voted to reject the amended plan.518 Next,
Class 3 produced four votes rejecting the plan, which constituted a dollar amount of $7,494.91,
and produced the vast majority of votes, 99, which favored acceptance of the amended plan and
represented $29,663,976.30 of the dollar amount voted.519
Subsequently, the Debtors and Committee submitted a memorandum to the court again
requesting that the amended plan and amended disclosure statement be confirmed for the
following reasons: (1) because the amended plan met each requirement for confirmation under
Section 1129(a); (2) because the amended plan met each requirement for confirmation under
Section 1129(b); (3) because Section 1129(c) was satisfied; (4) because Section 1129(d) was
satisfied; (5) because Article VI of the amended plan satisfied the requirement for the assumption
or rejection of executory contracts and unexpired leases; (6) because the injunction and

516

Garden City Group as Balloting Agent, Doc. No. 56.

517

Declaration Regarding Balloting Methodology, Doc. No. 686, at p. 2.

518

Id. at p. 7–8.

519

Id.
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exculpation in the amended plan were proper520; and (7) because the consolidation of the Debtors
benefits all creditors.521 In the memorandum, the Debtors and Committee provided extensive,
albeit primarily boilerplate, support for their third reason.522 Additionally, the managing director
of Conway MacKenzie, as the financial advisor to the Committee who would be named as the
creditor trustee, and the president of the Parkland Group, as the restructuring advisor to the
Debtors, both filed declarations supporting confirmation of the amended plan and amended

520

Injunction and exculpation releases are a hot-button issue in bankruptcy litigation, and circuit
courts have taken a fairly wide range of approaches to such provisions. Such a term in a
bankruptcy plan could bar a claim against a debtor, and, in some cases, nondebtors with certain
kinds of relationships with a debtor. 5 Bus. & Com. Litig. Fed. Cts. § 51:18 (3d ed.). The
majority of circuit courts, however, permit exculpations. Id. The Fifth, Ninth, and Tenth
Circuits permit such releases only in the context of asbestos cases and in certain scenarios
regarding the work of committees; the Third, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits apply rigid tests to such
provisions; and the Fourth Circuit applies the most stringent test. Id.; see also KUNEY &
BERNSTEIN, supra note 66, at 506–10.
Debtors’ and Committee’s Memorandum in Support of the Amended Plan, Doc. No. 687, at
p. 2.p. 4–33.

521

522

The Debtors asserted the following arguments regarding the validity of the plan and its
planned implementation: (1) that the amended plan complied with the relevant provisions of 11
U.S.C. § 1129(a)(1); (2) that they complied with the relevant provisions of 11 U.S.C. §1129(a)
(2); (3) that the amended plan was proposed in good faith pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §1129(a)(3); (4)
that all payments to be made by the Debtors were approved or would be approved by the court as
reasonable pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(4); (5) that the amended plan complied with the
disclosure requirements pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(5); (6) that the amended plan did not
contemplate a rate change subject to regulatory approval pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(6); (7)
that the amended plan satisfied the best interest of creditors test pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)
(6); (8) that all classes were either not impaired or accepted the amended plan pursuant to 11
U.S.C. § 1129(a)(8); (9) that the amended plan provided for the payment of priority claims
pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9); (10) that the amended plan was accepted by at least one
impaired, non-insider class pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(10); (11) that the amended plan was
feasible pursuant to 11. U.S.C. § 1129(a)(11); (12) that the amended plan provided for the
payment of fees pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1930 as required by 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(12); and (13)
that Section 1129(a)(13)–(16) was not applicable. Id. at p. 6–25.
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disclosure statement.523
In short, the Debtors primarily emphasized two overarching points. First, they asserted
that the amended disclosure statement contained “adequate information” to satisfy Section 1125
and, second, that the amended plan complied entirely with Section 1129, which governs the
procedural aspects of confirming a plan.524 Ultimately, their position would prove successful at
the confirmation hearing, thus underlying the reasonableness and non-extreme nature of the
amended plan and amended disclosure statement.525

523

Pidcock Declaration in Support of Confirmation, Doc. No. 688, at p. 1–8; Goddard
Declaration in Support of Confirmation, Doc. No. 693, at p. 1–8.
See Debtors’ and Committee’s Memorandum in Support of the Amended Plan, Doc. No. 687,
at p. 33.
524

525

See Transcript of December 9, 2010 Amended Plan Confirmation Hearing, Doc. No. 743, at
p. 2–3 (“[T]he plan . . . received overwhelming support from creditors.”).
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VIII. The Confirmation Hearing and Approval of the Chapter 11 Plan

On December 9, 2010, at the joint hearing, the court approved the amended plan and
amended disclosure statement and ruled on each of the objections.526 The amended plan was
ultimately approved: Two impaired classes – Class 2a and Class 3 – accepted the amended plan,
and the remaining classes were appropriately crammed down pursuant to Section 1129(b), as the
court found that the cramdown classes were treated fairly and equitably and without unfair
discrimination. 527 As such, the court made two major, required findings necessary to the
confirmation: (1) that the amended disclosure statement contained the requisite adequate
information under Section 1125, and (2) that the amended plan fully complied with
Section 1129.528
Next, the court addressed the objections and ruled overwhelmingly in favor of the
Debtors.529 The court recognized that three of the objections had been settled and subsequently

526

Order Confirming the Amended Plan, Doc. No. 698, at p. 1–34.

527

Id. at p. 11.

528

Id. at p. 13–14.

The confirmation hearing transcript revealed Judge Kendig’s frustration with the case and his
somewhat agitated demeanor in ruling on the objections. After the parties argued their cases, he
left the bench, and upon returning, he said:
[T]here were just so many objections filed prior to the hearing, most of which
were resolved, that I was really limited by how much time I could spend on a lot
of things not knowing what was going to be left standing at the end of the day.

529
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ruled on the two outstanding objections: that of the IRS and that of Ohio.530 Regarding the
settlements, first, the court approved the settlement providing OldCastle with a $75,000
administrative expense claim, so long as its $9,000 contribution was satisfied by an offset against
it.531 Second, Mr. Taylor’s pension claim was previously resolved and was handled by The
Garden City Group—no further substantive details were provided.532 Third, Allen Concrete’s
objection was resolved separately, and the court approved the settlement permitting the creditor
trustee to assert expense claims against the Debtors’ estates on behalf of Allen Concrete.533 The
other objections, including Ohio’s and the IRS’s, were overruled by the court.534 Regarding the
IRS, the creditor trustee was to make quarterly distributions from the effective date until five
years after that date. 535 Lastly, in addressing Ohio’s objection, the court found that Section
1129(a)(9)(C), which pertains to structured dismissal, was appropriately satisfied.536 Therefore,

And so that’s why I couldn’t just fire at the end of that hearing. And to the extent
that I guessed, I guessed wrong.
Transcript of December 9, 2010 Amended Plan Confirmation Hearing, Doc. No. 743, at p. 17.
530

Id.

531

Id. at 3–4, 17, 20–21.

532

Id. at 5, 17, 20–21.

533

Id. at 4–5, 14–15, 17, 20–21.

534

Id. at 17–20.

535

At the hearing, the IRS argued primarily to receive clarification regarding the intent of the
creditor trustee gift pursuant to the sale order. Order Confirming the Amended Plan, Doc. No.
698, at p. 14–15.
536

Judge Kendig ruled swiftly and somewhat generally on the issue of structured dismissal in
favor of the Debtors. He provided three main justifications: (1) that Section 1129(a)(9)(C)
doesn’t require mathematical certainty; (2) that such a ruling would not result in any prejudice;
and (3) that the effect of structured dismissal complied with Section 1129(a)(9)(C). Transcript
of December 9, 2010 Amended Plan Confirmation Hearing, Doc. No. 743, at p. 18–20.

94

the amended disclosure statement was approved in full, and the amended plan was confirmed
with minimal edits, rather than substantive, impactful revisions.
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IX. Fees and Payments

“. . . and it’s not over, I understand.” –Judge Kendig537
After the confirmation hearing, the vast majority of the bankruptcy case’s litigation
centered on payments of administrative claims, which were, notably, not restricted to being paid
solely from the administrative expense fund. 538 Nearly all professional services providers,
namely law and accounting firms, filed requests with the court for payment of their
administrative claims following the lengthy suit, and nearly all were agreed upon and paid within
a year after the amended plan’s confirmation. Seven professional services providers collected
the majority of the administrative claims payments, as distributed by the creditor trustee, and the
final amounts paid are the following (in order of confirmation by the court):
Firm

Fees Awarded

Expenses Awarded

Total Award

Frost Brown Todd539

$137,930.00

$3,437.48

$141,367.48

Conway Mackenzie540

$531,506.50

$15,944.23

$547,450.73

537

Transcript of December 9, 2010 Amended Plan Confirmation Hearing, Doc. No. 743, at p. 21.

538

Order Confirming the Amended Plan, Doc. No. 698, at p. 11–13.

539

Order for Compensation for Frost Brown Todd, Doc. No. 793, at p. 1.

540

Order for Compensation for Conway Mackenzie, Doc. No. 794, at p. 1.
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Freeborn & Peters541

$1,423,846.55

$56,616.30

$1,480,462.85

Bruner Cox542

$136,764.06

$2,625.51

$139,389.57

Hahn Loeser543

$225,571.50

$4,381.85

$229,953.35

The Parkland Group544

$132,036.50

$486.65

$132,523.15

Brouse McDowell545

$1,955.00

$7,897.22

$9,852.22

TOTALS:

$2,589,610.11

$91,389.24

$2,680,999.35546

As to other payments of claims pursuant to the amended plan, the creditor trustee filed a
total of six status updates with the court following the confirmation hearing that documented the
progression of those payments, the last of which was filed on August 19, 2014, nearly four years
after the amended plan was confirmed.547 As of the quarter ending on June 30, 2014, about
which the final status report was filed, the creditor trustee had distributed a total of
$2,824,823.65 as to claims made under the amended plan. 548 Therefore, only an additional

541

Order for Compensation for Freeborn & Peters, Doc. No. 795, at p. 1.

542

Order for Compensation for Bruner Cox, Doc. No. 796, at p. 1.

543

Order for Compensation for Hahn Loeser & Parks, Doc. No. 805, at p. 1.

544

Order for Compensation for The Parkland Group, Doc. No. 806, at p. 1.

545

Order for Compensation for Brouse McDowell, Doc. No. 823, at p. 1.

546

While $2,680,999.35 is certainly a large amount, it does not seem unreasonable or
unexpected, given just how long this bankruptcy proceeding lasted, and how much more
complicated it became than was necessarily anticipated at the time the petition was filed. See
Transcript of December 9, 2010 Amended Plan Confirmation Hearing, Doc. No. 743, at p. 21.
547

Creditor Trustee Disbursement Status Report, Doc. No. 1124, at p. 1.

548

Id. at p. 2.
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$143,824.30 was paid in total after the above administrative expenses were disbursed. 549
Because of just how complex this seemingly ordinary – or, at least, predictable – case became, it
is not entirely surprising that the administrative claims comprised the bulk of the claims paid
under the amended plan, although such a result essentially prevented most junior classes from
standing any chance at recovery.

549

See supra note 438. Given the fact that the administrative claims amounted to well over two
(2) million dollars, the remaining $143,824.30 that was left to distribute to all additional claims
appears fairly scant, thus realistically only permitting the most senior class stand to benefit from
the reorganization.
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X. Introduction: The Adversary Proceedings

As is common in most chapter 11 bankruptcy cases, there were a number of subsequent
adversary suits filed that “arose in” Schwab Industries’ bankruptcy proceedings after the final
sale order was entered. The Schwabs brought some of these disputes, and others were brought
against the Schwabs. Oftentimes after a chapter 11 bankruptcy process concludes, many of the
debtors and creditors tend to believe that they were entitled to more than what they ultimately
received. This mindset encourages debtors and creditors to bring these adversary lawsuits
against a variety of defendants for how the bankruptcy process was managed and carried out.
These adversary proceedings tend to center on claims that exist because of the bankruptcy itself,
not for some other unrelated cause of action. Because these proceedings are so related to the
bankruptcy process, it is more efficient to deal with these claims in bankruptcy court rather than
any other venue.

For these reasons, most adversary proceedings related to a chapter 11

bankruptcy case are judged and accordingly ruled on by the bankruptcy judge who was involved
in the corresponding chapter 11 case.
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XI. SII Liquidation Co. v. Schwab

A. Factual and Procedural Background
On February 28, 2012, John Pidcock, acting as the creditor trustee of the estate, brought
the SII Liquidation Co. v. Schwab adversary complaint alleging breaches of fiduciary duties for
alleged malfeasance in the pre-sale bankruptcy case. 550 The defendants were Jerry Schwab,
Donna Schwab, and David Schwab (collectively, “Schwabs”). Particularly, the creditor trustee
alleged that the Schwabs negotiated side deals with Cement Resources during the bidding
process. The creditor trustee claimed that those side deals diminished the sale value of the
business and thereby damaged the overall value of the estate.551
It is undisputed that the Schwabs negotiated side deals during the bidding process to
further their own personal gains, such as guaranteed management positions and other lucrative
incentives. Numerous emails were discovered as to the existence of these side deals, and the
negotiations were even referenced in the motion for revising the bidding procedures. 552 The
Committee even objected to both the negotiations and to Cement Resources being named as the

See supra, Section V. Section V of this paper, “The Sale Process – Part II,” provides greater
details regarding the facts surrounding the alleged breaches of fiduciary duties by the Schwabs.

550

551

Adversary Case 12-06022, Doc. No. 1034, at p. 12–16.

552

Motion for a Revised Bidding Procedures Order, Doc. No. 344, at p. 6–9.
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stalking horse bidder.553 While the particular facts of these negotiations are not in the record, the
actual existence of these side deals was not disputed.
The creditor trustee claimed that the side deals between the Schwabs and Cement
Resources eventually led to the Schwabs selecting Cement Resources as the stalking horse
bidder over OldCastle, whose allegedly outbit Cement Resources.

The creditor trustee

contended that the estate was damaged by these side deals because the Debtors’ businesses
would have sold for a higher price if the Schwabs had not negotiated their own management
opportunities with potential buyers, namely Cement Resources.
Despite the obvious behind-closed-doors dealing that was further detailed in a hearing on
the matter, the parties submitted an agreed order, which stated that the Committee’s objections
had been resolved, without any further elaboration.554 The Schwabs’ council even disclosed to
the court that the Schwabs had discussed their involvement with the company with the potential
buyers.555 Ultimately, however, OldCastle eventually won the bidding process for the Schwabs’
assets, and the corresponding sale order was submitted on May 28, 2010. The sale order
concluded (1) that the sale at issue was made in good faith and (2) that the purchase price was
fair and reasonable.556
B. Discussion
Nearly two years after the sale order was put in place, the creditor trustee brought this
action against the Schwabs for breaches of their fiduciary duties. The creditor trustee argued that
553

Objection to Motion for a Revised Bidding Procedure Order, Doc. No. 378, at p. 1–5.

554

Agreed Order Granting Motion for a Revised Bidding Procedure Order, Doc. No. 406, at p. 4.

555

Transcript of Hearing, Doc. No. 1118, at p. 9–15.

556

Order Approving Sale, Doc. No. 455, at p. 2.
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if the Schwabs had participated in negotiating the side deals at issue for their own pecuniary
gains, the Debtors’ assets would have sold for more at the auction, and the estate would not have
been correspondingly damaged.557 The Schwabs argued that the creditor trustee’s claims were
barred by the doctrine of res judicata and filed a motion for summary judgment as to the creditor
trustee’s claims.558
Four elements must be established for res judicata to bar a claim: (1) a final decision on
the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction, (2) a subsequent action between the same parties
or their privies, (3) an issue in the subsequent action which was litigated or should have been
litigated in the prior action, and (4) an identity of the causes of action.” 559 The first two elements
were not disputed in this adversary proceeding, but the creditor trustee alleged that the latter two
elements could not be established.
The court concluded that the creditor trustee’s claims should have been brought before
the final sale order was entered. The third prong of the res judicata doctrine bars an issue that
was litigated or should have been litigated in the prior action.560 The Sixth Circuit recognizes
that the key focus here should be whether the claim at issue should have been considered during
the prior action.561

557

Pidcock v. Schwab (In re SII Liquidation Co.), Nos. 10–60702, 12–6022, 2016 Bankr. LEXIS
146, at *28–31 (U.S. Bankr. N.D. Ohio Jan. 15, 2016).
558

Id.

559

Winget v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, 537 F.3d 565, 572 (6th Cir. 2008).

560

Id.

561

Sanders Confectionery Products, Inc. v. Heller Financial, Inc., 973 F.3d 474, 484 (6th Cir.
1992).
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The court found that the creditor trustee had ample opportunity and time to raise its
claims before the final sale order was entered.562 In opposition, the creditor trustee argued that
raising these claims would have been impossible because the Schwabs concealed the
negotiations. While the exact details of the negotiations were not revealed in the record, the
existence of the negotiations was. The Schwabs’ counsel even announced that negotiations had
taken place between the Schwabs and potential buyers regarding management opportunities
before the final sale. Furthermore, the court held a hearing on the matter before the sale order
was finalized, which resulted in the parties agreeing that the Committee’s objections had been
resolved.563 Likely the most damaging information to the creditor trustee’s argument was that
the creditor trustee himself had sent an email acknowledging his awareness that the Schwabs
were in negotiations for management agreements and equity.564 Therefore, because the creditor
trustee knew about the negotiations between the Schwabs and potential buyers before the final
sale order was entered, the creditor trustee should have raised the issue at that time.
Furthermore, the bankruptcy court also concluded that the fourth element of the res
judicata doctrine had been satisfied. The fourth prong requires an identification of the causes of
action. The test for whether two suits involve the same claim depends on the factual overlap
between the cases.565 “Two suits are . . . in respect to the same claim . . . if they are based on
substantially the same operative facts, regardless of the relief sought in each suit. 566 Thus, the
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Pidcock, Nos 10–60702, 12–6022, 2016 Bankr. LEXIS at *28–31.

563

Agreed Order Granting Motion for a Revised Bidding Procedure Order, Doc. No. 406, at p. 4.

564

Motion to Expedite Hearing, Doc. No. 246, at p. 10–12.

565

Heike v. Cent. Mich. Univ. Bd .of Trs., 573 F. App’x 476, 483 (6th Cir. 2014).

566

Id.
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court looks to determine whether the same set of facts supports both the former and latter causes
of action.567
Here, the court recognized that the creditor trustee’s claims were raised twice before the
final sale order was entered and that the claims were withdrawn on both occasions.568 Even
though the latter claim “was not actually litigated during the sale process, the overlap in the
findings supporting the sale order, including findings that the process generated the best price for
the assets and the sale was fair and reasonable, and the allegations of this complaint suggesting
Defendants’ actions harmed the sale process, create[d] an identity between the cause of action
for Res Judicata purposes.”569 As such, the issues raised and subsequently withdrawn before the
final sale order was entered were based on the same facts as the creditor trustee’s claims in the
ensuing action. This factual overlap was sufficient to satisfy the fourth prong of the doctrine of
res judicata.
Therefore, because the Schwabs were able to establish all four elements under the res
judicata doctrine, the creditor trustee was unable to bring this suit because his claims were barred
by res judicata.
C. Conclusion
Res judicata barred the creditor trustee from asserting claims against the Schwabs
following the bankruptcy case. As a result, the Schwabs’ motion for summary judgment was
ordered and signed. The fact that the creditor trustee knew about the Schwabs’ backdoor
negotiations before the final sale order was entered proved to be the most damaging evidence to
567

Id.

568

Pidcock, Nos. 10–60702, 12–6022, 2016 Bankr. LEXIS at *30.

569

Id.
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the creditor trustee’s claims. Even though such a ruling appears to incentivize debtors in a
bankruptcy case to negotiate behind closed doors for their own interests, this ruling reaffirmed
the notion that final sale orders in chapter 11 bankruptcy cases tend to remain final after being
ordered and signed. Potential buyers should take care to note that once a final sale order is
entered in a chapter 11 proceeding, the property or any other interest that they acquire will be
free of liens and a substantial amount of liability as to the case itself. This protection helps drive
up liquidation prices and benefits the estate, as a larger estate provides for enhanced recovery for
creditors, which is a major goal of bankruptcy law in and of itself.
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XII. Schwab v. Oscar (In re SII Liquidation Co.)

A. First Motion
i.

Factual and Procedural Background
On May 15, 2012, the Schwabs initiated an adversary proceeding the bankruptcy court

and alleged legal malpractice, fraudulent inducement, and negligent misrepresentation570 against
the attorneys who represented the Schwabs during the chapter 11 bankruptcy case. The Schwabs
contended that they were never aware of the defendant attorneys’ conflict of interest with one of
the Schwabs’ creditors during the bankruptcy case.571
The Schwabs argued that they were never made aware that their counsel had, and still
was, representing an affiliate of one the Schwabs’ largest creditors. In opposition, the defendant
attorneys argued that they had adequately disclosed the conflict of interest with the bankruptcy
court and obtained the court’s approval to represent the Schwabs in the bankruptcy case.572 The
record shows that the court had in fact previously permitted the defendant attorneys to hire
special counsel to represent the Schwabs in matters directly adverse to the creditor on March 24,
2010. 573

570

The Schwabs also signed a corporate resolution on February 26, 2010, which

Adversary Case 12-06035, Doc. No. 1047, at p. 6.

See supra § V. Section V of this paper – “The Sale Process – Part II” – provides greater
details as to the facts surrounding the alleged conflicts of interest pertaining to the Schwabs’
counsel during the bankruptcy case.

571

572

Application to Employ Hahn Loeser & Parks, Doc. No. 7.

573

Application to Employ Brouse McDowell as Special Counsel, Doc. No. 8, at p. 8.
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acknowledged and authorized the employment of special counsel for the defendant attorneys in
matters that would arise and be adverse to the creditor.574
In response to the Schwabs’ amended complaint, the defendant attorneys, joined by the
creditor trustee, filed a motion to dismiss the case. The defendant attorneys argued three main
points: (1) a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, (2) a lack of standing to sue, (3) and res judicata.
Although the court found that there was proper subject-matter jurisdiction, the court granted the
defendant attorney’s motion to dismiss because the creditor trustee retained the right to bring the
adversary suit as part of the bankruptcy case, not the Debtors, which included the Schwabs.
Furthermore, the court explained that if the Schwabs had standing to sue, the doctrine of res
judicata barred their claims.575
ii.

Discussion
a. Jurisdiction
The bankruptcy court ruled that it retained jurisdiction over the adversary proceeding

because the claims here “arose in” the bankruptcy case.576 A bankruptcy court “may hear and
determine all cases under title 11 and all core proceedings arising under title 11, or arising in a
case under title 11.”577 Therefore, if the Schwabs’ causes of actions “arose in” the bankruptcy
proceeding, the bankruptcy court would have jurisdiction to hear the case.

574

Id. at 10.

575

Schwab v. Oscar (In Re SII Liquidation Co.) Nos. 10–60702, 12–6035, 2012 Bankr. LEXIS
4374, at * 15 (U.S. Bankr. N.D. Ohio Sep. 20, 2012).
576

Id.

577

28 U.S.C. § 157(b).
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“Circuit appellate courts generally find that malpractice actions against professionals
employed by a bankruptcy debtor are proceedings that ‘arise in’ a title 11 case, providing a
bankruptcy court with the authority to enter final orders and judgments.” 578 Because these
malpractice claims are so intertwined with the corresponding bankruptcy case, keeping
subsequent adversary proceedings with the bankruptcy court provides the quickest and most
efficient method for adjudicating such claims.

Transferring those malpractice claims to a

different court would be too timely and cost-inefficient.
The Schwabs supported their claims by alleged that the defendant attorneys failed to
disclose a conflict of interest related to the bankruptcy case. Because all of the Schwabs’ causes
of actions were directly related to and arose during the bankruptcy proceedings, the court
properly concluded that it had jurisdiction to hear this case and enter judgments and orders
pursuant to to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b).
b. Lack of Standing
The court held that the Schwabs did not have standing to bring this suit because it
consisted of an estate claim, which belonged to the creditor trustee of the estate, not a debtor.579
In the bankruptcy context, when the harm deals directly with a debtor, the claim belongs to the
estate, and the trustee of the estate has standing to bring suit. 580 If the harm does not deal
directly with the debtor and is distinguishable and particular in some other way, however, then
the claim does not belong to the estate, and some party other than the creditor trustee of the

578

Schwab, Nos. 10–60702, 12–6035, 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 4374, at *8.

579

Id. at 25–26.

580

Ahcom, Ltd. v. Smeding, 623 F.3d 1248, 1250 (9th Cir. 2010).
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estate may bring suit.581 Therefore, if the harm to the Schwabs dealt directly with their role as a
debtor in the bankruptcy case, then their claim belonged to the estate, and the Schwabs would not
have standing to bring suit.582
The court found that the Schwabs had failed to identify any injury or harm that was
particular to them.583 The Schwabs argued that, as a result of the defendant attorneys’ actions,
the liquidation of the Schwabs’ assets as debtors was undervalued, which harmed the corporation
and impacted the shareholders. The Schwabs further contended that because they were the main
shareholders in Schwab Industries, they felt the substantial impact of the undervaluation. The
court found, however, that the harm to the Schwabs was not particular to them and was directly
related to their role as debtors in bankruptcy. As such, the claims were property of the estate and
were required to be brought by the creditor trustee of the estate.
The Schwabs further contended that they had standing to bring the suit because the
creditor trustee waived pursuit of the claims. The court correctly pointed out that such an
argument did not have proper legal support. “In order for the cause of action to re-vest in
another party, a trustee must abandon the claim.”584 The court therefore properly determined that
the creditor trustee of the estate never abandoned the claim and that the standing to sue was
property of the estate.

581

Id.

582

Honigman v. Comerica Bank (In re Van Dresser Corp.), 128 F.3d 945, 947 (6th Cir. 1997).

583

Schwab, Nos. 10–60702, 12–6035, 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 4374, at *25–26.

584

Id. at 23.
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c. Res Judicata
Even though the court determined that the Schwabs did not have standing to bring this
suit, the court further elaborated that even if the Schwabs had standing to sue, the doctrine of res
judicata barred their claims.585 For a malpractice claim to be precluded by res judicata, four
elements must be established: (1) a final decision on the merits by a court of competent
jurisdiction, (2) a subsequent action between the same parties of their privies, (3) an issue in the
subsequent action which was litigated or which should have been litigated in the prior action, and
(4) an identify of the causes of action.586 The court specifically held that the Schwabs should
have known from the final fee application of their right to bring the malpractice suit and related
claims.587 Thus, because the Schwabs should have known of their right to sue pursuant to the
final fee application and failed to do so accordingly, their claims were barred by res judicata.
The Schwabs contended that they did not know of their right to sue until after the fee
application had been submitted. The Schwabs further claimed that they did not know that they
had a potential claim until consulting with counsel some time after the final fee application was
entered. The court correctly found, however, that such a position was not in accordance with the
applicable law, as the doctrine of res judicata, rather, requires that potential plaintiffs know of
the factual basis of their claim, not the actual knowledge of being able to sue.588
Next, the Schwabs argued that they were unaware of the factual basis to sue because they
were unaware of the conflict of interest until after the final fee application was submitted. The
585

Id. at 21–23.
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Bittinger v. Tecumseh Prods. Co., 123 F. 3d 877, 880 (6th Cir. 1997).
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Schwab, Nos. 10–60702, 12–6035, 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 4374, at *31–33.
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Iannochino v. Rodolakis (In re Iannochino), 242 F. 3d 36, 48-49 (1st Cir. 2001).
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court did not find this argument persuasive. The Schwabs had signed a corporate resolution on
February 26, 2010, which acknowledged and authorized the employment of special counsel for
the defendant attorneys in matters arising adverse to the creditor.589 For the court, that resolution
provided sufficient evidence to establish that the Schwabs knew about the conflict of interest
before the final fee application had been submitted. Therefore, because the Schwabs were
factually aware that a conflict of interest had been present and chose not to litigate the issue
during the final fee application process, the Schwabs’ claims were correctly barred by the
doctrine of res judicata.
iii.

Conclusion
The court properly determined that it had jurisdiction to hear this case according to 28

U.S.C. § 157(b). The malpractice and other related claims properly arose in and during the
Schwabs’ chapter 11 bankruptcy case. Therefore, the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction to hear
this adversary proceeding and issue a judgment. The court also properly determined that the
Schwabs did not have standing to bring this suit because a claim that deals directly with the
debtor of a bankruptcy proceeding is the property of the estate and should be brought by the
estate’s creditor trustee. Lastly, the court properly determined that the doctrine of res judicata
barred the Schwabs’ claims because the Schwabs had been factually aware of the conflict of
interest and chose not to litigate it before the final application fee was finalized.
B. Second Motion
i.

Factual and Procedural Background
On September 20, 2012, the court entered a judgment dismissing the Schwabs’ amended

complaint against the defendant attorneys because the Schwabs lacked standing to sue and
589
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because the doctrine of res judicata barred their claims.590 The Schwabs never appealed that
decision. On September 20, 2013, however, the Schwabs filed a motion for relief from that
judgment under F.R.C.P. 60(b) claiming that new evidence had been discovered pertaining to
their malpractice claim.591 The Schwabs contended that further evidence had come to light that
showed that their bankruptcy counsel had conflicts of interest with some of the secured creditors
to the bankruptcy estate. 592 In particular, the Schwabs claimed that one of their counsel’s
colleagues had advised a secured creditor’s trust advisory committee on assigning life insurance
policies to the secured creditors.593

That same attorney had prepared a trust and split-dollar

agreement for the Schwabs in 1992.594
The Schwabs argued that this new information did not become available to them until
May 3, 2013. The Schwabs posited that this new information provided for previously unknown
grounds for relief. Recognizing the still-existing issue regarding standing to sue because the
malpractice claims belonged to the estate, the Schwabs argued that they would encourage the
creditor trustee of the estate to bring the malpractice suit or obtain an assignment of those rights.
ii.

Discussion
In the previous related proceeding, the bankruptcy court held that the Schwabs lacked

standing to sue because the malpractice claim was the property of the estate and should therefore
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be brought by the creditor trustee of the estate.595 The Schwabs attempted to circumvent this
issue by claiming they would encourage the creditor trustee to bring the suit or obtain an
assignment of the right to bring suit. The court has correctly found that because neither of those
propositions had yet occurred, the motion for relief from judgment should be denied and was
subsequently entered on January 22, 2014.
The court correctly concluded that even if the Schwabs obtained an assignment to sue,
they would still be barred from bringing their claim due to lack of standing. Standing to sue is
determined at the time of the filing of the complaint, not some time later in a proceeding.596 This
rule helps speed up the judicial process and keeps potential plaintiffs from bringing claims they
may never have standing to litigate. Therefore, because the Schwabs did not have standing to
sue at the time they filed their complaint, subsequent standing did not remedy their previous
standing deficiency.
The court ruled against the Schwabs and emphasized that right to bring the suit belonged
to the estate, not individuals. Even if the creditor trustee of the estate assigned its right to sue to
the Schwabs, the Schwabs would still not have standing because they did not have standing at
the time the motion was filed. As such, assignment of the right to sue from the creditor trustee
would not and did not cure the Schwabs’ lack of standing.
iii.

The Appeal
The Schwabs timely appealed the order denying their motion for relief from judgment to

the United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Sixth Circuit. In its appeal, the Schwabs
challenged the bankruptcy court’s ruling that they did not have standing to bring their

595

Schwab, Nos. 10–60702, 12–6035, 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 291, at *3.

596

Cleveland Branch, NAACP v. City of Parma, 263 F.3d 513, 524 (6th Cir. 2001).

113

malpractice claims. The appeals court concluded, however, that the law-of-the-case doctrine
applied and that the Schwabs were barred from bringing their claims.597
The law-of-the-case doctrine instructs that challenges to judicial decisions are barred
when there was a chance to properly appeal the decision and no appeal was ever made.598 A
plaintiff cannot submit another motion contesting a judge’s decision in order to re-litigate the
previous case and to add new facts. As such, a Rule 60(b) motion is not a form of appeal in and
of itself.599
As to the Schwabs, the court found that they had the opportunity to appeal the initial
order denying their standing to sue for the malpractice claims against the defendant attorneys.
The court further concluded that the judge’s order denying the Schwabs’ complaint was a final,
appealable order. Because the Schwabs did not appeal that order and instead filed a Rule 60(b)
motion in hopes of re-litigating their case, the rule-of-the-case doctrine applied, and the
Schwabs’ Rule 60(b) motion was accordingly dismissed.
iv.

Conclusion
The rule-of-the-case doctrine correctly barred the Schwabs from bringing their Rule

60(b) motion. Plaintiffs cannot side-step appeal procedures and re-litigate issues by filing Rule
60(b) motions. Furthermore, the Schwabs had not cured their standing to sue because the
creditor trustee of the estate had neither decided to bring suit on behalf of the estate nor assigned
the right to bring the suit to the Schwabs. Therefore, the Schwabs’ Rule 60(b) motion was
properly dismissed.
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XII. Conclusion

In conclusion, the Schwabs’ equity lost. At the beginning of the bankruptcy case, the
Schwabs wanted to retain as much equity as possible. This goal required the Schwabs to
aggressively negotiate with their pre-petition creditors, who preferred a quick liquidation, and to
attempt to secure third-party financing to preserve going-concern value. The Schwabs resisted a
quick sale of all of their assets because such a speedy sale would have extinguished their equity
interests, and, therefore, erased any chance for future returns from their businesses.

The

Schwabs’ interests quickly changed, however, once they were denied post-petition
financing. After the court denied post-petition financing, the Schwabs were eager to make a deal
with a potential buyer so that they could retain management positions and secure other lucrative
incentives. This quick shift in interests incentivized the Schwabs to agree with pre-petition
creditors on certain issues in order to speed up the bankruptcy and sale process. Shortly
afterward, Schwab Industries was sold, though not to the stocking horse bidder, and the
unsecured creditors and equity were left with nothing.
Additionally, the Schwabs’ bankruptcy illustrates the pitfalls of leverage. Schwab
Industries was generating $200 million in revenue only a few years before filing for
bankruptcy. The Schwabs leveraged their businesses by borrowing large amounts of cash from
big banks to pay for the businesses’ supplies. Leveraging a business seems to work great when
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business goes as planed. But, unfortunately for the Schwabs, the 2008 financial crisis
significantly affected the construction industry and drastically reduced Schwab Industries’
revenue. Because the Schwabs relied heavily on leverage, their businesses were extremely
vulnerable to such market volatility. As a result, Schwab Industries was unable to operate once
revenues started to decline, and the Schwabs were consequently forced to file a chapter 11
bankruptcy petition.
The last major takeaway regarding the Schwabs’ handling of their bankruptcy is that the
debtor’s counsel should encourage his or her client to disclose everything. The doctrine of res
judicata will keep a debtor free and clear of most subsequent litigation so long as all relevant
information pertaining to the debtor is disclosed to the court. While this result seems like an
unintended consequence of the doctrine, its effects go both ways. On one hand, potential buyers
in a chapter 11 bankruptcy need to feel comfortable bidding on a debtor’s assets in order to
ensure a maximum price. On the other hand, if the doctrine of res judicata did not apply to
bankruptcy sales, then potential buyers would be hindered from paying the maximum price
because they would fear future litigation regarding prior liens and other related
issues. Generating a maximum price from a debtor’s assets is a central purpose of chapter 11
bankruptcies, and res judicata supports this endeavor.
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